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APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
SPACECRAFT STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM 
By P. D .  Smith 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
SUMMARY 
ily 1961, NASA distributed to potential contractors t..e original Apollo space- 
craft development statement of work containing the basic ground rules for design of the 
Apollo spacecraft. A contractor was  selected to  design, develop, and fabricate the 
launch escape system, command module, service module, and spacecraft/lunar module 
adapter. Structural development progressed from the basic ground rules outlined in the 
statement of work through development testing to obtain design information, through com- 
ponent tests,  and then into static and dynamic tests of full-size modules and combined 
modules. Concurrently with the ground testing, boilerplate vehicles were manufactured 
and flown to obtain data during abort and normal boost flights. These data were then used 
in the design and testing of spacecraft modules. 
This report discusses the structural evaluation from the awarding of the contract 
through ground and flight tes ts  to the time of the first lunar landing mission in July 1969. 
The spacecraft modules are described, and ground and flight tes ts  having structural sig- 
nificance a r e  discussed as well as anomalies occurring during the ground and flight tests.  
The conclusions reached in this report a r e  that rigorous test programs a r e  needed 
to uncover any weakness in structural design o r  manufacturing defects; that care  should 
be exercised in the design and inspection of honeycomb sandwich construction; and that 
extreme care  should be taken to assure  that correct boundary conditions a r e  imposed on 
the component during testing. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Apollo spacecraft structure has five modules: the command module (CM), the 
service module (SM), the lunar module (LM), the spacecraft/lunar module adapter (SLA), 
and the launch escape tower (LET). The structure of the LM is discussed in a separate 
report, but the structural  systems of the other modules a r e  discussed in this report. 
The Apollo structural  subsystem consists of the primary structural  framework, the 
structural shell, mounts for tanks and engine, and a support structure for equipment and 
electrical and plumbing lines. The CM boost protective cover (BPC) and the CM/SM 
fairing a r e  also part  of the structural subsystem. 
The Apollo structure evolved in two 
phases referred to as Block I and Block 11. 
When the spacecraft design began, the con- 
cept of a lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) mis- 
sion had not been approved; therefore, the 
CM was  not designed to dock with another 
vehicle. The f i r s t  phase of the vehicle de- 
sign (denoted Block l') was  well underway 
when it was decided to proceed with an LOR 
mission. The most practical approach was 
to continue the Block I design effort and test  
program and to provide docking hardware 
and other changes to the spacecraft later.  
The vehicle configuration that included the 
docking hardware was  designated Block 11. 
The Apollo Block I spacecraft configuration 
is shown in figure 1. 
The development plan for the struc- 
tural  subsystem specified that the structural 
elements would be designed based on the 
maximum flight load conditions and on the 
worst - cas e environmental conditions ex- 
pected during the mission. These loads and 
environmental conditions were changed con- 
tinually as they were defined more accu- 
rately. Development tests were conducted 
on the elements and subassemblies of the 
spacecraft to verify the basic techniques 
used for analysis, design, and manufacturing. 
Wherever possible, well-known and reliable 
design techniques, types of structures, and 
structural materials were used to avoid ex- 
tensive development. The Apollo Program 
was the first spacecraft program in which 
extensive use was made of large, bonded, 
honeycomb sandwich panels as a primary 
load-carrying structure. 
The flightworthiness of the Apollo 
spacecraft structure was  verified primarily 
through a rigorous, vehicle level, ground 
test program. This ground testing was sup- 
plemented by flight tes ts  and a formal loads 
Xa = Apollo station 
XS SM station 
Xc = CM station 
XL = Launch escape 
system station 
XL400.8 
Xa141?d.2 'T- Launch escape assembly 
J4 
Xa 502 Aft interface to Saturn I Y  B 
instrument u n i t  
Figure 1. - Block I spacecraft 
configuration. 
and s t ress  analysis. The problems involved in developing and verifying the structural 
subsystem and the manner in which these problems were resolved a r e  discussed. Be- 
cause verification of the structural design was accomplished mainly by ground testing, 
sidered in determining the modifications to the basic structural design. These anomalies 
and their resolutions a r e  discussed and a detailed description of the spacecraft structure 
is contained in this report. The ground and flight tes ts  a r e  also described. 
I the failures and anomalies encountered during this testing were the primary factors  con- 
2 
DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURE 
The Apollo statement of work (SOW) contained the ground rules for design of the 
structure,  described the basic functions of the spacecraft (SC), and specified that the 
structural  subsystem would be designed to protect the crewman and the equipment from 
meteoroids, radiation, and thermal extremes. In addition to normal flight loadings, 
the structure would be designed to withstand (1) tumbling of the escape vehicle at max- 
imum dynamic pressure during launch, (2) an entry acceleration of 20g measured along 
the axis of symmetry, and (3) aerodynamic noise emanating from the launch escape 
system (LES) during both the launch and escape modes. 
determination of external and internal loads, analysis of the structure for these internal 
loads, development of materials and processes, development testing, verification testing 
and analysis in lieu of testing, major ground tests, and flight tests.  Development of the 
baseline structural configuration of the spacecraft began with established mission re -  
quirements, progressed into functional requirements, and then evolved into a design 
concept. Trade-off studies were conducted to establish the proper design approach. 
Changes to the basic configuration resulted from design improvements and from defi- 
ciencies discovered during analysis of ground and flight test  data. Additional require- 
ments for modifications were determined during manufacturing, installation, design 
reviews, and stacking (joining of modules) of the flight article. 
The development plan contained the following milestones: basic concept design, 
The Block I spacecraft was  certified partly by a formal loads and s t r e s s  analysis. 
Beginning in 1967, a complete, formal structural analysis for Block I1 was  prepared 
using SC-103 as a baseline vehicle (ref. 1). Data on the most recent external and in- 
ternal loads, on vibration and thermal environments, and on the latest design weights 
and trajectories were used. Changes to the flight characteristics and the weight of the 
launch vehicle, as well as data obtained from instrumented spacecraft flight vehicles, 
were incorporated into the analysis of the Block I1 design. In addition to baseline anal- 
ysis, loads for each subsequent mission were compared to baseline loads, and any new 
structural  modifications were analyzed. 
The testing of the Apollo structure was planned so as to ensure against uncertainties 
in design and fabrication. Development tes t s  were conducted to obtain basic design in- 
formation before assembly testing. Components were then tested to verify the design 
concept. Complete modules were tested to verify design strength and to establish the 
confidence needed to proceed with flight tests.  The plan used in the testing of major 
modules was to test  all critical loading conditions where practical. When loads were 
multidirectional, a sufficient number of selected conditions to verify the structural  
strength were tested. When both thermal and mechanical s t resses  were present, heat 
was applied or  mechanical loads were increased, where practical, to account for thermal 
effects. This ground test  program identified areas that needed to be modified and pro- 
vided confidence that the structure could withstand the design environment. 
3 
STRUCTURAL DESCRl PTION 
Block I 
This section describes the structural subsystems as designed originally. Modi- 
fications to this original design a r e  discussed in chronological order.  
Launch escape system. - The LES is designed to propel the CM away from the 
remainder of the spacecraft and booster during an abort from the launch pad through the 
early portion of the second-stage boost when the LES is jettisoned. The LES configu- 
ration is illustrated in figures 2 and 3. The LES includes the nose cone, canard as- 
sembly, pitch control, launch escape and tower jettison motors, structural  skirt ,  tower 
structure, tower/CM separation assembly, BPC, and forward heat shield separation 
and retention assembly. However, only the tower, structural skirt ,  and BPC a r e  
considered par t  of the structural subsystem. 
The LET assembly is a t russ  made of welded titanium tubing with fittings at the 
The tower is insulated to ends for attachment to the structural  skir t  and CM (fig. 4). 
protect it from aerodynamic heating and impingement from the launch escape motor 
plum e. 
The structural  skir t  is a truncated cone that distributes the loads among the four 
tower attach points to the launch escape motor. The forward ring of the skirt  mates 
with a flange on the aft end of the motor (fig. 3). The skir t  assembly is made of tita- 
nium and is protected from aerodynamic heating and impingement from the launch es- 
cape motor plume by an ablative coating. 
Nose cone 
Pitch-control motor 7 
launch escape motor 
Power systems and 
instrumentation 
wire harness 
Insulation 
BPC lapex section) 
Figure 2.  - The LES assembly. 
XL 400.7 
Nose cone 
Canard s u b a s s e m b l y 7  
Tower jettison motor assembly 
26-in. diameter 
Launch escape motor 
Structural 
skirt 7 
X l  0 
Figure 3. - The LES structure. 
387.3 
4 
I 
lube J: 2.5-in. outside diameter. 
0.15-in. wall ablative material 
lubes I ,  L ,  M, 0, Q: 2.5-in. 
outside diameter, 0.05-in. wall inches 
lubes F, P: 3.5-in. outside 
diameter, 0.125-in. wall 
Dimensions denote 
thicknesses i n  
Figure 4. - The LET structure 
and insulation. 
Laminated fiberglass 
Honeycomb f core laminated 
fiberglass panel 
AR boost cover 
motor D o r t s 4 W  
Figure 5.  - Block I CM boost 
protective cover. 
The BPC protects the CM from 
damage caused by aerodynamic heating 
during the boost phase or by launch escape 
motor plume heating in the event of an 
abort. It is attached to the LES tower and 
is jettisoned with the LES. The BPC 
(fig. 5) consists of the following three 
basic assemblies. 
1. The forward cover is a conical- 
shaped hard cover that extends from 
station Xc 81 forward to the apex of the 
spacecraft. It is connected to the LET at 
station Xc 96. The hard cover is made of 
0.69-inch-thick fiberglass honeycomb sand- 
wich material and has a coating of cork 
bonded to the outer surface. 
2. The flexible aft cover is designed 
so  that it drapes over the CM heat shield. 
It extends from station Xc 81 to station Xc 14 
and is made of three layers of material: 
an inner layer of glass fabric impregnated 
on the inner surface with Teflon, a center 
layer of 0.0095-inch-thick Nomex fabric, 
and an outer layer of 0.3-inch-thick cork. 
3. The hatch panel covers the CM 
hatch and is made of fiberglass honeycomb 
sandwich material with a layer of Armalon 
bonded to the inside surface. A window 
permits crew visibility from inside the CM. 
Command module heat shield. - The 
CM heat shield encloses the inner structure 
and consists of the forward, crew compart- 
ment, and aft sections (fig. 6). The heat 
shield is constructed of ablative material 
bonded to brazed P H  14-8 steel honeycomb 
panels. The forward section is conical, 
extends from station Xc 81 to station Xc 133, 
and houses the Earth-recovery system and 
two reaction control system (RCS) pitch en- 
gines. It is jettisoned before landing to ger-  
mit deployment of the parachutes. The 
crew compartment continues the conical 
shape and extends from station Xc 81 to 
station X 23. The crew compartment 
heat shield is attached to the inner structure 
C 
5 
Forward Xc 133.5 
compartment 
heat shield 
LET leg well /-xc 80.75 
Brazed stainless 
steel honeycomb 
*Crew hatch 
t' .\ Crew 
Insulation J?P!; 
Inner 
structure 
L Umbilical housing Aft c o r n p a r t m y  heat shield 
Figure 6. - Block I CM heat shield. 
by longitudinally oriented stringers and 
f rames  and by one circumferential f rame.  
The frames a r e  located between sta- 
tions Xc 23 and Xc 43, and the stringers 
a r e  located between stations Xc 4 3  and Xc 81. 
Slotted holes in the frames and s t r ingers  
permit radial movement caused by thermal 
effects. The aft heat shield is a shallow, 
spherically contoured assembly that en- 
closes the large end of the CM and is at- 
tached to the aft bulkhead of the inner 
structure with 59 bolts. These bolts a r e  
installed in oversize holes to permit the 
heat shield to move relative to the inner 
structure.  
Command module inner structure. - The CM inner structure is a pressure  vessel 
that houses the crew, the equipment required for  crew comfort and safety, and the 
equipment required to control and monitor the spacecraft systems. 
the CM inner structure. The structure provides a load path from the LES/CM interface 
(fig. 1) to the CM/SM interface. The CM has an internal volume of approximately 
365 cubic feet. The inner structure is enclosed by the CM heat shield for  thermal pro- 
tection and is subdivided into the forward apex, forward sidewall, aft sidewall, and aft 
bulkhead sections. 
Figures 7 and 8 show 
-Access cylinder 
Forward hatch 
r L E T  attach point 
-Aft longeron 
Figure 7. - Block I CM 
inner structure.  
Forward bulkhead 
1 Aft bulkhead inner 
face sheet assembly 
Figure 8. - Block I CM 
inner shell. 
6 
Forward apex: The forward apex structure consists of the access cylinder as- 
sembly and a flat forward bulkhead, both made of aluminum honeycomb. The volume 
between the inner mold line of the forward heat shield and the outer mold line of the 
apex structure houses the Earth-landing system and its associated interfaces, the for- 
ward heat shield ejection system, the pitch engines of the CM RCS, and part  of the post- 
landing uprighting system. 
The forward bulkhead contains four support longerons, which attach to the LET 
feet by explosive bolts. The longerons a r e  continuous across  the bulkhead and down the 
forward sidewall to the ring at  station X 42. The two longerons on the plus-Z side of 
the bulkhead have integrally machined lugs that extend into the crew compartment and 
mate with the s t ru ts  of the crew couch foot attenuator. The two longerons on the 
minus-Z side of the bulkhead have bolt-on fittings that partially support the fixture for 
the main display panel. All four longerons have integrally machined flanges that attach 
to the four apex gussets. 
C 
Forward sidewall: The forward sidewall (forward half of the crew compartment) 
is a truncated cone with the base at  station X 42 .7  and the top intersecting the forward 
bulkhead. The structure is made of aluminum honeycomb and contains the sidewall por- 
tion of the longerons as integral members. Two additional longerons a r e  bonded to the 
inner mold line 23 inches on either side of the minus-Z axis and extend from 
station Xc 81. 5 to station Xc 4 2 . 7 .  Both longerons have integrally machined'lugs that 
extend into the crew compartment and mate with the crew couch head attenuator struts.  
C 
The crew compartment sidewall has six major penetrations: a crew hatch, two 
rendezvous windows, two side windows, and a guidance and navigation frame. Each 
penetration has a machined frame welded to the inner skin and bonded to the honeycomb 
core and outer face sheet. 
Aft sidewall: The aft sidewall is an inverted truncated cone with the base at 
station Xc 4 2 . 7  and the top intersecting the aft bulkhead at  station Xc 14.07 .  The volume 
between the inner mold line of the crew compartment and aft heat shield and the outer 
mold line of the aft sidewall contains the engines and tanks of the RCS system, part  of 
the environmental control system (ECS), the waste water tank, four crushable ribs,  part  
of the CM postlanding uprighting system, part  of the CM/SM umbilical, and equipment 
that can withstand being exposed to the environment of space. The aft sidewall is a 
honeycomb sandwich shell with nine integral longerons. Six of these longerons are coin- 
cident with the radial beams of the SM and serve as part  of the CM/SM load interface. 
T,wo of the remaining three longerons are continuations of the main forward longerons. 
The third supports a s t rut  from the crew couch. 
The aft sidewall contains 23 T-stringers bonded to the outside face sheet to inter- 
face with the crew compartment heat shield frames. The primary shear and torsion 
load path from the crew compartment heat shield to the inner structure is through 
fiberglass angles bolted to the aft sidewall at about station Xc 41. 7. The aft sidewall 
contains a continuous machined ring that is welded to both the inner skins of the side- 
wall and aft bulkhead and the integral longerons. The honeycomb cores  and outer face 
sheets of the aft shell are bonded to this ring. Two fittings are bolted to this ring and 
to two aft longerons and interface with the Z-Z  attenuator s t ruts  of the couch. 
7 
Aft bulkhead: The aft bulkhead is a shallow, honeycomb dome with the concave 
side upward. It is attached to the aft sidewall at the ring at  station Xc 14. This bulk- 
head forms the lower end of the crew compartment and supports the aft ring in a radial 
direction. 
Service module. - The SM contains the spacecraft primary propulsion system, 
RCS, fuel cells and associated equipment for providing electrical power, and radiators 
for environmental control and electrical power subsystems cooling. A fairing encloses 
the space between the SM and CM and houses the structural  connection between the two 
modules. 
The SM structure is shown in figures 9 and 10. The SM outer structure is a cy- 
lindrical section of 1-inch-thick bonded aluminum honeycomb sandwich. The upper end 
of the SM is enclosed by a 1-inch-thick aluminum honeycomb bulkhead, and the aft end 
is enclosed by a 3-inch-thick aluminum honeycomb bulkhead. A heat shield attached to 
the aft side of the aft bulkhead protects the bulkhead structure and service propulsion 
system (SPS) tanks and plumbing from heat caused by the SPS engine being fired. The 
interior is subdivided by six one-piece radial beams. The upper ends of these beams 
a r e  made in the form of triangular t russes  with circular pads to support the CM. Three 
tension ties structurally join the CM to the SM; explosive devices sever these ties to 
separate the CM from the SM. One of these tension t ies is shown in figure 11. 
Flyaway ground- 
ment tower 
+z support-equip- 
I umbilical 7 
Sector E(%") Mylar insulat ion lcovers ent i re  area) 
Forward bulkhead 
r,- Fuel storage SMICM fa i r ing Sector II (60") Oxidizer Storage 
Figure 9. - Block I service module. 
8 
Compression pad 
Figure 10. - Block I SM general 
arrangement. 
I 14.500 
n 
- V X C  23 .xK)  
r l e n s i o n  tie 
1010 4 Ablative material 
Figure 11. - The CM/SM interface. 
I I 154 in. 
The center tunnel formed by the ra- 
dial beams houses the SPS engine and two 
helium pressurization tanks. The SPS pro- 
pellant tanks a r e  located in  four of the six 
bays and a r e  supported on the aft bulkhead. 
The four RCS engine quadrants a r e  mounted 
to the SM external shell, and the associated 
tanks a r e  attached to the interior of the 
shell on hinged doors. 
Spacecraft/lunar module adapter. - 
The SLA is the load-carrying structure be- 
tween the SM and the instrument unit (IU) 
of the launch vehicle. It protects the LM 
during the boost phase of flight and supports 
the LM on four ball joints located at sta- 
tion X 585. Figure 12 shows the dimen- 
sions of the SLA. 
a 
The conical shell is divided into two 
sections: the upper section from the SM 
interface to the LM attachment plane and 
the lower section from the LM attachment 
plane to the IU interface. The upper and 
lower sections of the shell consist of four 
quarter panels spliced together with longi- 
tudinal plates. The panels a r e  1.7-inch- 
thick aluminum honeycomb sandwich. The 
frames are bonded into the panels and are 
spliced at the quarter-panel joints with me- 
chanical fasteners. The lower section has 
chemically milled areas of varying thick- 
nesses in both face sheets to distribute the 
concentrated loads from the LM into the 
shell. Both the upper and lower sections 
have reinforced access  holes that a r e  cov- 
ered by doors during flight. 
Pyrotechnic devices separate the SLA 
from the SM and simultaneously cut the SLA 
forward section longitudinally at  its four 
splice joints and circumferentially a t  the 
LM attachment plane. The four panels then 
deploy approximately 40" to expose the LM 
for docking or to permit the SPS to propel 
S-IPB instrument u n i t 2  
Figure 12. - Spacecraft/lunar 
module adapter. 
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the command and service module (CSM) from the SLA and booster if an abort is required 
after jettisoning of the LET. The pyrotechnic separation lines a r e  shown in figure 13. 
Apollo flight vehicles SC-009, SC-011, and SC-101 did not include an LM but used 
a stiffening member in the SLA in place of the LM. 
weighed approximately 70 pounds and provided the stiffness necessary to stabilize the 
SLA shell structurally. 
This stiffener, shown in figure 14, 
 separation line 
LBlast shield 
Separation 
Figure 13. - Adapter panel 
separation lines. 
S L A ~  
Figure 14. - Structural stiffener. 
Block I I 
More than a year before the f i rs t  Block I spacecraft was flown, the Block I1 space- 
craft design was begun. 
and from the Block I structural  ground test  program was  combined with the new require- 
ments for a vehicle that could dock with an LM and perform a lunar mission. A sketch 
showing the Block II spacecraft general arrangement with station numbers is shown in 
figure 15. 
The structural experience gained from the boilerplate flights 
Structural changes from Block I to Block I1 were numerous; the major changes a r e  
described in the following sections. 
reference 1. 
Some of the vehicle descriptions a r e  taken from 
Launch escape system. - Modifications were made to conform the BPC to the m d -  
ified CM shape caused by relocation, deletion, and changes to such parts as umbilicals, 
antennas, RCS engines, and ablator thicknesses. Figure 16 shows the Block I1 BPC. 
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X ~ 3 9 8 . 5  
X, 1483.1 
Figure 15. - Block I1 integrated 
stations and axes. 
RCS Ditch enaine w r t s  - 
RCS pitch engine ports 
RCS roll 
+Z 
Hard cover seal 
CM heat shield ablator 
Silicone sponge seal --I 
Figure 16. - Block I1 boost 
protective cover. 
Command module. - The Block I1 
heat shield confimration is shown in 
figure 17. 
fied to a truncated cone. The stainless 
steel honeycomb substructure was  modified 
to essentially the same substructure as that 
flown on SC-017 and SC-020. Figure 18 
shows the inner structure of the Block I1 CM. 
Changes made in the tunnel a rea  to provide 
docking capability included adding a docking 
ring and latches and a thermal isolation ring. 
The CM/SM umbilical was relocated to the 
plus-Z axis, and the parachute attachment 
The forward portion was modi- 
Xc 104.5 
Brazed steel honeycomb stainless d-c- Xc 81.13 
Insulation - 
Inner  
structure 
xc 43.42 fil&r 
xc 23 23 
Figure 17. - Block I1 CM heat shield. 
Forward bulkhead 
Figure 18. - Block 11 CM 
inner structure. 
was modified to a single attachment fitting for the two drogue and three main parachutes. 
All storage bays were modified because of repackaged and redesigned CM equipment. 
The three CM/SM tension t ies were strengthened. 
All Block I1 command modules used the unified side hatch. After the SC-012 f i re ,  
the CM two-hatch system was redesigned to provide a single, integrated, outward- 
opening hatch. This redesigned hatch was made with an aluminum slab inner structure 
and an ablative material heat shield outer structure;  fiberglass honeycomb insulation was 
sandwiched between the two structures.  On SC-106 and subsequent vehicles, the hatch 
was modified by machining the slab to 0.1-inch thickness in many small  a reas  to peduce 
weight. 
Service module. - The Block I1 SM is illustrated in figures 19 and 20. The re -  
quired factor of safety for the structure aft of the forward bulkhead was reduced from 
1 . 5  to 1 .4  because total weight increases to the CM and LM would have caused an in- 
crease in weight of the SM and SLA structure if the factor of safety had remained at 1.5. 
The booster was designed primarily with a factor of safety of 1.4;  therefore, the deci- 
sion was made to design the SM and SLA with a 1.4 factor of safety. The required struc- 
tural  factor of safety forward of the SM forward bulkhead was kept at 1.5 to  make the CM, 
LES, and CM/SM interface stronger than the remainder of the spacecraft and booster. 
The structure between the SM forward bulkhead and the CM provides the base fo r  a CM 
abort and w a s  not designed to be the "weak link" in the structure used during aborts. 
The forward bulkhead was  modified to permit equipment to be mounted on it. The 
longer Block I SPS tanks had been installed through holes in the forward bulkhead; 
the shorter Block IT tanks were supported by three s t ruts  attached to the forward dome. 
Equipment previously located in bay I was relocated to reserve bay I for experi- 
ment equipment. The three fuel cells were relocated to the forward end of bay IV, 
and the two oxidizer tanks for the fuel cells  were located on a common shelf in bay IV. 
Electronic equipment previously in bay I was relocated to the forward bulkhead. 
12 
r G r e e n  docking light 
Scimitar antenna 
+-- edension 
Forward 
Figure 19. - Block I1 service module. 
SMICM fairing 
Sector ll (70") 
Oxidizer sump - Sector m 160") Oxidizer storage -, 
Sector I I509 
-SM RCS 
motor 
(four sets) 
-Radial 
beam 
. +Y 
sctor (60") 
Fuel storage, 
Fuel sump> Aft b u l k h e a d 1  
Figure 20. - Block I1 SM 
general configuration. 
The thicknesses of the radial beam webs were changed from 0.018 i 0.005 inch to 
0.015 f 0.003 inch. The electrical power system (EPS) radiators were relocated to the 
CSM fairing. 
The outer shell panels that enclosed bays I1 and I11 and bays V and VI (SPS tank 
bays) were changed to two 130" panels. This permitted the ECS radiators to be contin- 
uous across  the 130" panel, and the radiator tubes were oriented horizontally instead of 
vertically as in the Block I design. The outer skin material of the shell panel w a s  
changed from 7178-T6 to 2024-T81 aluminum to provide greater strength at elevated 
temperatures. The thicknesses of the panel face sheets also were changed. Additional 
RCS propellant tanks were added, which required lengthening the RCS doors to approxi- 
mately 96 inches. 
The SM also was modified to relocate the CSM umbilical to the plus-Z quadrant. 
Six sway braces  also were installed (two each on beams 2, 4, and 6) to reduce axial- 
torsional coupling at the CM/SM interface. 
Spacecraft/lunar module adapter. - Only minor modifications were made to the 
original SLA design. 
SC-020), 10 new access ports were added to the vehicle structure for servicing the LM 
on the pad; 4 access  ports were deleted; and the personnel access door on the plus-Z 
axis was enlarged to accommodate LM equipment while on the pad. 
Before the LM w a s  flown on the late Block I flights (SC-017 and 
The LM design weight increased from 26 500 pounds at the t ime of the original 
SLA design to 29 500 pounds and then later to 32 000 pounds. The loads imposed by the 
29 500-pound LM required some design changes to the LM attachment ring at sta- 
tion Xa 585; however, because the decision had been made to reduce the design factor of 
safety of the SLA from 1 . 5  to 1.4, the effect of the LM weight change from 29 500 pounds 
to 32 000 pounds was minimized. 
The.SLA panels originally were designed to deploy to 40" * 5". To provide ad- 
ditional clearance for extracting the LM, this angle was changed to 45" * 5". In the 
spring of 1968, the panels were designed to be jettisoned, and this design was  f i r s t  
flown on the Apollo 9 mission. At the same time, a spring system also was designed to 
eject the LM. 
TEST DESCR I PTI ON 
Block I 
Static tests.  - The development test  program was started in the latter part of 1962 
and continued through 1965. The majority of the development tes ts  were tes ts  in which 
new methods of construction, joints, and material  properties were verified before pro- 
ceeding to assembly tests, full-scale module testing, and stacked configuration tests.  
Appendix A lists the Apollo Test Requirements (ATR) number and briefly describes the 
purpose of each development test. 
Component-level development testing was conducted to evaluate and verify specific 
a reas  of the modules for specific environments before full-scale module testing began. 
A summary of these tes ts  is presented in appendix B. 
Module-level tests. - Tests of CM o r  CSM complete assemblies were conducted 
to demonstrate that the structure would meet the design requirements under critical 
load and environmental conditions. 
ules in the stacked configuration, a stub tower was  used to introduce loads into the 
upper end of the CM, and a short cylindrical section was used to simulate the adapter 
at the aft end of the SM. The stack was tested to Saturn V maximum qcu, lift-off, and 
first-stage end-boost conditions. The load was applied in the direction to produce the 
analytically determined critical loading on the structure. The various module-level 
tes ts  a r e  identified in appendix C together with the ATR number and test objectives. 
During the tes ts  of the command and service mod- 
Dynamic tests.  - Dynamic testing was  conducted at  the development, component, 
full-size module, and stacked module levels. Appendix D briefly decribes the objectives 
of the tests and l ists  the ATR numbers. Two ser ies  of dynamic tes ts  were conducted 
at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) (formerly the Manned Spacecraft 
Center (MSC)); one used a boilerplate vehicle (BP-9), and another used a production SM 
and a boilerplate CM (BP-27). 
In mid-1963, two vibration test programs were conducted by MSC on the BP-9, 
SM, insert, and adapter assembly at Ellington Air Force Base, Houston, Texas. These 
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tests were designed to determine the dynamic characteristics of the BP-9 structure. 
The results of the f i r s t  test  program indicated a possible structural deficiency; as a re -  
sult, modifications were made to several ring frames and longerons. The second test  
program was conducted to determine dynamic characteristics of the modified structure. 
These tes t s  provided data that were later correlated with instrumentation data produced 
during the flight of the boilerplate structure. 
The dynamic testing of a boilerplate CM and a production Block I SM structure was 
conducted on BP-27 at MSC in January and February 1965. Although designated as a 
boilerplate, the SM was actually a production model with mass  simulated and dummy 
equipment installed to provide correct dynamic response. The CM was  a t rue boiler- 
plate. This se r ies  of tes ts  was designed to determine the overall lateral  modes of the 
stacked command and service modules in the free-free configuration and to obtain the 
shell modes of the SM. 
After these tests,  BP-27 was  shipped to the NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight 
Center (MSFC) to be mated with other spacecraft and booster modules for dynamic testing. 
The test  configuration consisted of an LET, a launch escape motor, the BP-27 CSM, 
SLA-1, a cruciform flight stiffener in lieu of an LM, an IU, and a Saturn IVB (S-IVB). 
Data from the tes ts  revealed significant oscillating torsional movement of the CM with 
respect to the SM. Investigation revealed that the single sway brace designed to provide 
torsional restraint  at the CM/SM interface w a s  not tight. The sway brace had an over- 
s ize  hole in one end to permit easy installation of the brace, and the testing had further 
elongated the hole. A new sway brace was installed with a tight-fitting bolt that reduced 
the torsional motion but did not eliminate it. The sway braces on all subsequent space- 
craft were drilled on assembly and installed with tight-fitting bolts. Additional torsional 
restraint  was recommended in September 1965. Because insufficient evidence was avail- 
able to prove that a change was  mandatory, no modification was made. 
Saturn V dynamic test data and MSC analysis showed that one sway brace was  insufficient. 
Five braces were installed on Block I SC-017 and SC-020, and six were installed on all 
Block I1 spacecraft. The five-brace configuration was installed on the MSFC test  vehicle 
and demonst rated successfully. 
Later MSFC 
Acoustic environment tes t s  of the SC-007 Block I command and service modules 
were conducted in 1965. 
Landing impact tests.  - The landing impact test  program on Block I vehicles was 
designed to test  the integrity of the spacecraft structure only and did not include testing 
of the internal attenuation s t ruts  of the crew couches. 
The Apollo spacecraft was originally designed to land on land; however, in the 
spring of 1964, the primary landing mode w a s  changed to a water landing. 
was made primarily because water landing sites are more numerous throughout the world 
and because energy-absorbing systems fo r  land landings a r e  more complicated than those 
required for  water landings. The increased weight of the vehicle increased the rate  of 
descent to the point where it was doubtful the structure could withstand a land landing. 
This change 
The Block I landing impact test program consisted of numerous impacts of boiler- 
plate test  vehicles on both land and water. These drop tes ts  began in 1962 and used BP-1 
and BP-2 as test  art icles.  These boilerplate vehicles were not structurally similar to 
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the spacecraft but could be classified as rigid-body vehicles. The drop tes ts  had the 
following obj ectives. 
1. To evaluate crew shock attenuation system at land impact 
2. To evaluate vertical and transverse acceleration loads at  land impact 
3. To determine and evaluate the stability and dynamics of the vehicle 
4 .  To evaluate g-forces on the primary structure and simulated crew couch 
5. To confirm preliminary cr i ter ia  and determine if any new conditions existed 
The f i r s t  test  art icle to approach any similarity to the flight vehicle was  BP-28, 
which was built to test  the aft heat shield, aft bulkhead, and plus-Z toroidal area.  Be- 
cause the manufacturing tooling was in use for  flight hardware, the construction of BP-28 
differed somewhat from the flight hardware. For example, the aft heat shield was  made 
from aluminum honeycomb instead of steel honeycomb and therefore required a different 
total thickness and different face sheet thickness to obtain the same cross-sectional 
moment of inertia as the production heat shields. On the first BP-28 drop, the aft heat 
shield crushed on impact and pierced the aft bulkhead of the inner structure. This fail- 
u re  is discussed la ter  in this report. After the BP-28 failure, the aft heat shield was 
redesigned by making the face sheets thicker and using denser honeycomb core in the 
impact area of the heat shield. 
At this time, consideration was  given to cutting one of the two legs of the main 
parachute harness to increase the hang angle from the nominal of 27.5" to approximately 
35", thus decreasing the impact pressures  on the aft heat shield. The heat shield was  
designed with thicker face sheets and a denser core  extending into the plus-Z/minus-Y 
quadrant as opposed to a design symmetrical about the Z - Z  axis. 
The plus-Z quadrant of the forward bulkhead and tunnel was  also found to be under- 
strength fo r  pressures  caused by water impact angles above 27.5". The tunnels on 
SC-009 and SC-011 were filled with foam. The forward bulkhead and tunnel a r eas  were 
modified on SC-017 and subsequent vehicles. These changes a r e  shown in table I. The 
modifications consisted of replacing the honeycomb core in the plus-Z quadrant with 
densified core, using thicker face sheets and doublers on the tunnel, and adding densified 
core to some areas  of the tunnel. 
Block I impact testing was  concluded with seven BP-28 watel' drops, two CM-007 
water drops, and one BP-12A water drop to verify the sides and forward bulkhead a rea  
and the redesigned heat shield. 
16 
TABLE I. - APOLLO CM DESIGN CHANGES FOR WATER IMPACT 
I 
I 
I 
I I Component SC-002 and SC-009 sc-oia SC-017, SC-020, and Block 11 I 
-~ ~ ~~ 
Honeycomb core  No change Densified core  at impact a rea  Densified core at  impact a rea  
Inner aft sidewall No change Doubler 0.020-in. aluminum; 0.032-in. aluminum was 0.016-in. 
face sheets  180" segment (outer only) aluminum; 180" segment (outer only) 
Aft heat shield 
face sheets  
~~ 
Docking tunnel 
face  sheets  
Core 
~~ 
Bonded doublers 
Stepped 0.042, 
0.022, and 
0.012 in. 
Dual hang-angle 
caoabilitv 
~ ~ 
No change No change 
Chemic ally milled 
Stepped 0.050, 0.030, and 
Dual hang-angle capability 
0.020 in. 
Chemically milled 
Stepped 0.050, 0.030, and 
Single hang-angle capability 
0.020 in. 
Forward bulkhead No change No change I I core  I Densified plus-Z quadrant I 
0.025 in. was 0.016 and 0.010 in. 
0.050 in. was 0.016 and 0.010 in. 
Doubler 0.016 in. (inner) plus- and 
Doubler 0.040 in. (inner) plus-2 quadrant 
Densified core plus-Z quadrant, plus- and 
(outer) plus- and minus-Y quadrant 
(outer) plus-Z quadrant 
minus-Y quadrant 
minus-Y quadrant 
Flight tests.  - The Block I flight development program was separated into boiler- 
plate and spacecraft flights. Pad abort tes ts  (using only the LES motor for propulsion) 
and higher altitude abort tes ts  (using Little Joe I1 rocket boosters) were conducted at the 
White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) on several  boilerplate vehicles and one production 
spacecraft. Flights from the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) used both 
boilerplate and spacecraft vehicles and were launched on Saturn I, Saturn I-By and 
Saturn V boosters. The boilerplate flight history is documented in table 11. 
Boilerplate : The boilerplate vehicles used for flight were structurally similar. 
The command modules were made of 0.19-inch welded aluminum plate with internal lon- 
gerons that distributed the loads from the LET and provided connecting points for six SM 
longerons. The command modules were covered with cork for protection from heating 
before the use of the BPC on BP-23. Al l  service modules, adapters, and inserts used 
for the Saturn flights were constructed with six longerons, 0.16-inch aluminum shells, 
internal f rames,  and stringers.  The service modules were approximately 152 inches 
long; the adapters and inser ts  for  the Saturn flights were 92 inches and 52 inches, re- 
spectively, with 154-inch diameters. The launch escape towers were very similar to 
production models. Table ILI lists each flight boilerplate and the modules used to make 
up each configuration. 
Spacecraft: The flight test program for the Block I spacecraft was  planned to cer-  
tify the spacecraft structural design and LES for la ter  manned flights. In the flight test  
program, emphasis was placed on man rating Apollo hardware in space and providing 
sufficient levels of flight test  verification and proficiency in flight operation to ensure 
mission success. 
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TABLE 11. - APOLLO BOILERPLATE FLIGHT HISMRY 
Hission 
PA- 1 
A-001 
AS- 101 
AS- 102 
A-002 
A-003 
PA- 2 
Boilerplate 
BP-6 
BP-12 
BP- 13 
BP-15 
BP-23 
BP-22 
BP-23A 
Purpose 
To demonstrate that the Apollo 
spacecraft could abort from 
the launch pad and to  recover 
the spacecraft crew 
To determine aerodynamic and 
operational character is t ics  
of the launch escape vehicle 
(LEV) during an abort at a 
transonic velocity and high 
dynamic pressure  
To confirm capability of LES 
to propel CM away from 
Little Joe I1 launch vehicle 
TO demonstrate the compatibility 
of the spacecraft with the launch 
vehicle in launch and exit trajec. 
tory and environment for Apollo 
Earth-orbital flights 
To demonstrate the primary 
mode of the LET jettison 
using the LET jettison motor 
S a m e a s  for AS-101 except that 
alternate mode of tower 
jettison was demonstrated 
using pitch-control and 
launch-escape motors 
To demonstrate satisfactory 
LEV performance using 
canards and the BPC 
To verify the abort capability 
in the maximum dynamic pres-  
sure  region with conditions 
approximating the Saturn 
emergency detection subsys- 
tem limits 
To demonstrate satisfactory 
LEV performance at  an alti- 
tude approximating the upper 
limit for the canards (Test 
conditions were not achieved 
because of a failure of the 
Little Joe I1 launch vehicle; 
however, the LEV performed 
satisfactorily under the actual 
abort conditions.) 
To  demonstrate the ability of 
the LES using canards and 
the BPC to abort from the 
launch pad and to recover 
the spacecraft crew 
Launch date  
Nov. 7, 1963 
May 13, 1964 
May 28, 1964 
Sept. 18, 1964 
Dec. 8, 1964 
May 19, 1965 
June29, 1965 
Launch s i te  
White Sands 
Missile Range, 
N. Mex. 
White Sands 
Missile Range, 
N. Mex. 
John F. Kennedy Space 
Center, Fla. 
John F. Kennedy Space 
Center, Fla. 
White Sands 
Missile Range, 
N. Mex. 
White Sands 
Missile Range, 
N. Mex. 
White Sands 
Missile Range, 
N. Mex. 
Report number 
TM X-5321 
MSC-R-A- 64- 1 
MSC-R-A-64-2 
MSC-R-A-64-3 
MSC-R-A-65-1 
MSC-A-R-65-2 
MSC-A-R-65-3 
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TABLE III. - BOILERPLATE CONFIGURATIONS 
Boilerplate 
BP- 6 
BP- 12 
BP-13 
BP-15 
BP-23 
BP-22 
BP-23A 
Cod igur at ion 
LES, CM, and pad abort adapter (truss) 
LES, CM, SM, and 10-in. extension to mate with 
Little Joe 11 
LES, CM, SM, insert, and adapter 
Same as BP-13 
Same as BP-12 
Same as BP-12 
Same as BP-6 
Mission A-004; SC-002: The f i rs t  spacecraft flight was that of SC-002 in Janu- 
a ry  1966. The primary structural  objective of this flight was  to demonstrate the integ- 
rity of the LES structure for an abort in the power-on tumbling boundary region. This 
vehicle consisted of an LES (including BPC), CM, SM, and an aluminum ring that mated 
the SM to the Little Joe I1 booster. The structure was  basically a production model. 
The heat shield for the CM had cork for an ablative material, and the substructure had 
bonded doublers as described in table I.  The CM was modified because, in May 1965, 
an analysis revealed that 18 of the 24 frames in the CM aft compartment were under- 
strength. Further analysis determined that SC-002 would be satisfactory if one of i ts  
aft f r ames  (number 9) was modified and a precompressed gasket was installed between 
the aft  and crew compartment heat shields. This gasket was also included on all heat 
shields having spacecraft-type ablative material. The gasket provided a vertical load 
path from the aft heat shield to the crew compartment heat shield for some of the loads 
that would otherwise have been transferred through the aft frames. The SM had no op- 
erating systems. Four steel  plates, weighing 2000 pounds 'each, were installed for 
ballast on the aft bulkhead of the SM in sectors 11, 111, V, and VI. One RCS engine was 
production type with mass-simulated tanks; the other three engines and tanks were 
simulated. 
Before the SC-002 flight, several structural changes had been required. The dy- 
namic tes t s  conducted on BP-27 at  MSFC had revealed the need for a tight-fitting sway 
brace at the CSM interface, and the dynamic testing on SC-007 SM had shown several  
a reas  Of concern, one of which was the integrity of the SM radial beams. To further 
test the beams, 14 channels of flight instrumentation on SC-002 were reallocated to 
continuously record s t ra ins  of the webs of radial beams 2, 4, and 5. The purpose of 
the 14 s t ra in  measurements was to obtain data on the dynamic response of the radial 
beam webs to the acoustic environment during flight so that a comparison of these 
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fluctuating s t resses  could be made with s t r e s ses  obtained during the simulated ground 
acoustic test  of SC-007. This comparison would ascertain whether the radial beam webs 
were prone to fatigue failure. Adhesive-backed damping tape was installed on one side 
of the web on radial beam 2 to assess  the effectiveness of that tape in reducing the dy- 
namic response of the webs. 
The flight plan for SC-002 was  to launch on the two-stage Little Joe I1 booster; 
initiate an abort maneuver at approximately 60 000 feet; orient the launch escape vehicle 
(LEV) to the proper CM base-down attitude with the canard system; jettison the tower; 
and proceed to impact with the normal parachute Earth-landing mode. 
The SC-002 was  launched at WSTF on January 20, 1966, at  8:17 a .m.  m. s. t. , 
and the CM landed 410.0 seconds later.  Significant excerpts from the postflight report 
state: 
"Analysis of the flight data indicates that spacecraft 002 performed with no struc- 
tural  problems throughout the flight. Interface loads calculated for the maximum load 
flight conditions throughout the flight show that the limit load capability of the structure 
was  not exceeded. . . . The measured differential pressure (on the CM) was  lower than 
the planned pressure (11.1 pounds per square inch differential (psid)) because: (a) the 
plume impingement pressures  were about 80 percent of those predicted for  a nominal 
mission, and (b) the internal pressure in the aft compartment was higher than planned 
by approximately 1 .5  PSI . . . . Based upon tracking and onboard films, in addition to 
the pressure data, the boost protective cover performed as planned . . . . Examination 
of all spacecraft strain, pressure,  and acceleration data indicated that the spacecraft 
performed adequately in the launch environment . . . . Service module outer shell and 
interior vibration data show levels much lower than those obtained in acoustic tes ts  
simulating the flight environment. One exception to this is the vibration level of the in- 
ner flange of radial beam 5 which was approximately the same as that obtained in the 
acoustic tests, although the spectral  distribution was different. This high level indicates 
a much greater transmissibility from the outer shell to the radial beam inner flange than 
was  obtained in the acoustic tests.  At present this phenomenon is not understood. It 
(Subsequent examinations suggest that the radial beam inner cap braces failed due to ex- 
pansion of the SM during transonic flight. The braces were modified for  SC-011 and 
subsequent vehicles. ) "Command module vibration data show levels lower than those 
obtained in acoustic tests.  The majority of data throughout the flight was close to the 
noise of the instrumentation systems. 'I 
Mission Apollo-Saturn 201 (AS-201) ; SC-009: After the successful flight of SC-002, 
the flight test  program proceeded to SC-009, already on the launch pad at KSC. On mis- 
sion AS-201, SC-009 was launched on a Saturn I-B launch vehicle. Lift-off occurred 
from KSC on February 26, 1966, at  11:12 a.m. e. s . t . ,  and the CM impacted in the 
South Atlantic Ocean near Ascension Island approximately 37 minutes later.  
The structural  test objectives were to  demonstrate the structural  integrity and 
compatibility of the launch vehicle and spacecraft, to confirm loads, and to verify oper- 
ation of the CM heat shield for entry from low Earth orbit. A complete description of 
the mission is given in reference 2. Spacecraft 009 was  structurally similar to SC-002 
but included for f i rs t  flight both the SLA and flight stiffener. 
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Analysis of the flight data showed that the vehicle loads were less than expected 
and that all loads were well within the capability of the spacecraft. Data from the space- 
craft vibration instruments indicated relatively low levels except on the SLA panels, 
which exceeded the expected levels. Based on these data, the environmental vibration 
cr i ter ia  for the SLA panels were updated. 
Mission AS-202; SC-011: Spacecraft 011 was launched by a Saturn I-B booster on 
August 25, 1966 (ref. 3). The structural objectives were essentially the same as for  
SC-009. Spacecraft 011 was approximately 11 000 pounds heavier than SC-009 primar- 
ily because of additional SPS propellant. The SLA had a television camera mounted in- 
side to view the four SLA panels as they deployed. The structural configuration was 
essentially the same as that of SC-009 except for the following differences. 
1. The LES tower leg fitting w a s  changed from a casting to a die forging. 
2. The CM aft sidewall outer skin thickness was changed from 0.016 to 0.036 inch. 
3. A doubler was added under the parachute retention bracket. 
4. The aft heat shield of SC-011 had integral variations in the skin gage where 
SC-009 had bonded doublers. The shear-compression pads were strengthened on the 
SC-011 heat shield. 
5. The spherical washers used to determine the amount of preload in the tension 
tie linkage were replaced on SC-011 with strain-gaged bolts to provide better accuracy. 
The structural  capability was  the same as that of SC-009. 
6. The SC-011 SLA hinge backup structure was strengthened. 
The structural  flight test  objectives were satisfactorily accomplished. However, 
during the CSM/SLA and S-IVB separation, the SPS plume impinged on two of the opened 
SLA panels, breaking the retention system on these two panels. Failure of the retention 
system w a s  assumed because two of the panels moved out of the camera field of view. 
A proximity SPS firing of this type normally would not occur except during an SPS abort; 
therefore, this failure of the panel retention system was  considered acceptable. 
data indicated that all loads were low during the mission. 
Flight 
Spacecraft 012: Many structural  modifications were made to SC-012. A matrix 
of configuration differences between SC-011 and SC-012, together with the reason for  
each, is given in table IV. 
All applicable ground testing had been completed satisfactorily and SC-012 was 
considered structurally acceptable for  manned flight when the disastrous CM f i r e  oc- 
curred on the launch pad at KSC in January 1967. 
Apollo 4 mission; SC-017: Spacecraft 017 was the f i r s t  spacecraft to be launched 
on a Saturn V booster. The primary structural objective of the unmanned SC-017 was 
the demonstration of structural and thermal integrity and compatibility of the launch 
vehicle and spacecraft. The structural configuration was essentially the same as that 
of previous spacecraft except that four sway braces had been added at  the CM/SM 
21 
TABLE IV. - SPACECRAFT 011 AND 012 CONFIGURATION DIFFERENCES 
Item 
:M heat shield honeycomb 
material 
3M aft frames and 
fittings 
3M roll engine panel 
assembly mater ia l  
CM inner structure 
outer skin over 
most of plus-Z half 
of aft sidewall 
CM inner structure second- 
a r y  equipment support 
CM forward tunnel 
Pilot parachute mortar  
canister fitting to CM 
forward bulkhead joint 
CM forward bulkhead joint 
to forward sidewall 
Flotation bag attach points 
and cables 
Pad at  the CSM station 
1010 interface 
SM RCS tank bracket 
material 
SLA longitudinal debris 
catcher material 
sc -011  
'recipitation hardened 
(PH) 15-7 
(orma1 frame 
?H 17-4 corrosion- 
resistant s teel  
3asic 0.016-in. skin 
with a 0,020-in. 
doubler 
Face-sheet-to-core bond 
allowable, 650 psi  
Xormal tunnel filled 
with foam for addi- 
tional support 
Bonded 
Skin joint 
Normal attach points and 
cables 
Pad adjusted by varying 
the shim thickness 
Aluminum 
Fiberglass 
sc-012 
PH 14-8 
Strengthened frame 
6A1-4V titanium 
Basic 0,032-in. skin 
Face-sheet-to-core bond 
allowable, 400 psi 
Tunnel skins and honey- 
comb core  strength- 
ened 
Bolted 
Strengthened skin joint 
by using a doubler and 
cherry rivets 
Strengthened attach points 
and cables 
New design of pad for 
adjustment 
Fiberglass 
Aluminum 
Reason 
PH 14-8 has less  notch sensitivity 
and more  uniform heat treatment 
characteristics. 
To obtain a factor of safety of 1 .  5 
for  the f rames  and fittings. 
To reduce weight and facilitate 
manufacturing. 
Basic 0,032-in. skin i s  a more  
efficient structure. 
To increase design confidence of 
equipment support. 
To make SC-012 structurally capable 
for  the latest water landing loads. 
Schedule problems on SC-011 did 
not allow the strengthening. 
To obtain a factor of safety of 1. 5. 
Change was made because of low pro- 
duction quality verification (PQV) 
results. 
To obtain a factor of safety of 1. 5. 
The ablator mold line for  SC-012 and 
subsequent vehicles was not known 
The pad allowed adjustment to 
varying CM ablator thicknesses. 
New thermal requirement to prevent 
the fuel in the tanks from freezing. 
Fiberglass catcher failed the quali- 
f icat ion tes ts .  
interface. Interference from equipment prevented the installation of a sixth sway brace 
as in the Block I1 design configuration. Another mission structural  objective was to 
confirm launch loads and dynamic characteristics. Details of the flight a r e  presented 
in reference 4. The mission was completed as planned, and the primary structural  
objective w a s  accomplished satisfactorily. 
Apollo 5 mission: The Apollo 5 flight was designed to check out the LM. Because 
this flight was primarily concerned with the LM, it is mentioned only for continuity. 
Apollo 6 mission; SC-020: The flight of SC-020 was the last  unmanned mission 
and the last mission of the Block I flight test  program. The structural  performance of 
SC-017 (Apollo 4) had been satisfactory, and no problems were expected on SC-020. 
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Both missions had secondary objectives of demonstrating CSM/SLA/LTA'/Saturn V 
structural  compatibility and determining spacecraft loads in a Saturn V launch environ- 
ment. The structural  instrumentation was essentially the same as that on SC-017. 
The structural  configuration of SC-020 was essentially the same as that of SC-017 
except for  incorporation of the new unified CM hatch and a modification to two SPS tank 
skirts.  Based on results of the SM static test  that showed the tank skir ts  in bays I1 
and VI to be understrength, a modification to these two skir ts  was made on the pad 
at KSC in March 1968. 
During the first boost stage of the mission, portions of an SLA panel failed and 
separated from the spacecraft. The SLA continued to sustain the flight loads, however, 
and the mission w a s  accomplished successfully. Details of the flight a r e  presented in 
reference 5 and in the section entitled "Flight Anomalies. 
Block II 
Static tests.  - Although considerable static testing had been accomplished to ver- 
ify the Block I design, the structural modifications, increased weight, and center-of- 
gravity changes of the Block I1 design required an extensive ground test  program. 
However, most of the development test work accomplished for Block I spacecraft was 
applicable to Block I1 spacecraft, so  the Block I1 test  program consisted mainly of com- 
ponent testing and full-scale module testing. Appendix E contains a list of the structural 
tes ts  in the Block I1 program and gives the title, ATR number, and objective of each 
test. 
Dynamic tests.  - The Block I1 structural dynamic tes ts  were conducted on SC-105 
at  MSC (ref. 6). Both vibration and acoustic tests were conducted during February and 
March 1968. This program had two primary objectives: (1) the demonstration of the 
structural  integrity of Block I1 CSM wiring, plumbing, bracketry, and installed sub- 
systems when subjected to the dynamic loads resulting from spacecraft exposure to the 
aerodynamic noise environment of atmospheric flights, and (2) the demonstration of the 
structural  integrity of the Block I1 CSM when subjected to the low-frequency vibratory 
motions produced during atmospheric flight. 
The only structural anomaly that occurred during the dynamic testing was a bent 
SPS tank support strut .  The strut  is attached to the top of the SPS fuel storage tank. 
Investigation of installation procedures determined that this failure was caused by im- 
proper installation. The installation procedures were modified to prevent such damage 
from reoccurring . 
Water landing impact tests.  - Part of the Block I1 water drop test program was  
conducted at the contractor plant and part at MSC. The portion of the test program con- 
ducted by the contractor established that the Block I1 CM could land on water safely at 
its specification weight. The MSC test program was conducted because changes to the 
'Lunar module test  .article. 
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CM equipment and the resulting increased weight required a redefinition of the compat- 
ibility of the structure at  these new conditions. The contractor test  program consisted 
of two drops, designated impact tes ts  103 and 104, and used CM 2s-1  (also designated 
CM-99). The 2s -1  configuration was a production-type CM except that it had (1) cork 
in place of the heat shield ablator, (2) a Block I type aft heat shield, (3) an SC-002 in- 
ner crew hatch, (4) simulated uprighting bags and container assembly, and (5) a simu- 
lated astrosextant ablator panel. 
anthropomorphic dummies in the crew couches. 
The tes ts  were conducted with three instrumented 
Impact test  103 was conducted on November 11, 1966. The measured vertical 
velocity was approximately 3 1 ft/sec and the horizontal velocity was  approximately 
47  ft/sec. The primary test objective was  to verify the structural integrity of the crew 
compartment heat shield, forward sidewall, forward bulkhead, tunnel, and ablative 
hatch with respect to water leakage. Structural damage that .occurred included buck- 
ling of the crew hatch inner skin, numerous cracks and tears  in the fiberglass panels 
and fairings in the plus-Z quadrant on the forward bulkhead, and a skin puncture in the 
forward bulkhead probably caused as a result of the fairing failure. A small  quantity of 
water leaked into the spacecraft, possibly through the pressure relief valve. 
Impact test  104 was conducted on December 16, 1966. This drop had a measured 
vertical velocity of approximately 34 ft/sec and a horizontal velocity of approximately 
39 ft/sec. The primary test objective was  to verify the structural integrity of the aft 
heat shield, the aft bulkhead, the aft inner sidewall, and the secondary structure. The 
configuration was similar to that used in impact test  103 except that a Block I1 sym- 
metrical core aft heat shield was used. The drop test  was successful. 
The water impact test  program was conducted at MSC during the summer of 1968 
and used BP-28A and CM-099 as test  art icles.  A total of nine water impact tes ts  was 
conducted. Of these, eight drops were conducted with vertical velocity only. The ninth 
was dropped with both horizontal and vertical velocities. Drop conditions and weight 
were selected to represent the latest CM ra te  of descent and impact angle. During the 
fourth and fifth drop tests,  the face sheets of the aft heat shield wrinkled outside the 
bolt circle, the corrugated torus section buckled near the interface between the aft heat 
shield and sidewall, and cork used to simulate the ablator separated from the outer skin 
near where the torus buckled. 
During the ninth drop, the core  located in the minus-Z side of the minus-Y axis 
of the aft heat shield sheared. A buckle also occurred along a joint at  the quarter panel 
splice in the minus-Z/plus-Y quadrant of the aft heat shield. 
and the face sheet separated from the core;  however, there was no evidence of core  shear.  
The CM remained watertight in all three (fourth, fifth, and ninth) drops. 
verified the structural capability of the CM for the latest weights and impact velocities. 
The aft bulkhead buckled 
These tes ts  
Flight tests.  - The Block I1 spacecraft structure had been adequately qualified by 
Block I ground and flight testing and Block I1 ground testing and was therefore considered 
operational. The flights of Block I1 spacecraft had no structural objectives, and the 
spacecraft carried only minimum structural instrumentation. Structural descriptions 
of the flight vehicles and discussions of structural  performance during all Block I1 
flights a re  presented in the mission postflight reports.  
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S I  GNI FI  CANT PROBLEM AREAS 
Most problems encountered during the development and verification of the Apollo 
structural  subsystem were discovered in the ground test program when the structure 
failed to meet specified cr i ter ia  when exposed to environments and loads. Each failure 
was carefully analyzed, and the specific test cri teria were reassessed. In some cases,  
this reassessment revealed that the test conditions were too severe and should be made 
more realistic. In other cases, structural inadequacies that required design modifi- 
cations were identified. Some modifications required retesting; others were certified 
by analysis. 
Significant problems encountered in the ground and flight test  programs and the 
resolutions of these problems a r e  discussed in this section. 
Block I Ground Test Anomalies 
Command module static tes ts  (ATR 111014). - Several tes ts  were conducted to 
demonstrate that the support structure of the CM Earth-landing system was  adeauate. 
One of these tests,  conducted on CM-006, w a s  planned to demonsirate the strength of 
the pilot parachute mortar  and the hardware that attached it to the upper bulkhead. The 
mortar  fittings were attached to the upper bulkhead by bonding the fittings to the outside 
face sheet of the aluminum honeycomb. When the static load was applied, the bond be- 
tween the mortar  fitting and the bulkhead failed in tension at 63 percent of limit load. 
Inserts were bonded into the aluminum honeycomb, and mechanical fasteners were used 
to attach the mortar  to the inserts. This modification was incorporated on SC-004, 
tested successfully to 150 percent of limit load, and then installed on all Block I 
spacecraft. 
Command module static structural-thermal test  (ATR 251003). - One objective of 
this test was  to evaluate under simulated entry conditions the structural-thermal charac- 
terist ics,  such as deflections, s t resses ,  gaps-, misalinements, and temperatures of the 
heat shield components. The test  was  conducted on CM-004A. The CM had been de- 
signed with a tight-fitting joint between the crew compartment heat shield and the aft heat 
shield so that, during atmospheric entry, the hot boundary-layer gases would not enter 
the cavity between the inner structure and the heat shield. However, during the test, 
deflection data indicated there was a separation between the aft heat shield and the crew 
compartment heat shield. A silicone rubber seal was placed at the interface between the 
two heat shields to prevent hot gases from entering the cavity. This seal  was compressed 
by tightening the bolts that attached the aft heat shield to the inner structure. No ad- 
ditional testing was conducted for  this condition, and the addition of the seal  was  cer-  
tified by analysis. 
Water impact test  (ATR 101001). - The Block I landing impact test program was 
planned to demonstrate the structural  integrity of the CM for landing both in water or on 
land. The f i r s t  water drop test with a test  article representative of the spacecraft used 
BP-28. This test  art icle was designed to be used for many drops and was constructed 
so that damaged sections could be replaced with minimal difficulty. Because the manu- 
facturing tooling was  in use for flight hardware, BP-28 was constructed differently than 
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flight hardware. 
instead of steel honeycomb and therefore required a different total sandwich thickness 
and different face sheet thickness to obtain the same cross-sectional moment of inertia 
as the production heat shields. 
For example, the aft heat shield was  made from aluminum honeycomb 
On October 30, 1964, BP-28 was dropped into water at impact velocities of 
34.2 ft/sec vertical and 44. 5 ft/sec horizontal, which represented the most severe 
three-parachute landing condition. The aft heat shield crushed on impact and pierced 
the aft bulkhead of the inner structure. 
BP-28 was not a production configuration, it was sufficiently similar to show that a re -  
design was necessary. Aft heat shield pressure impact data (from one-fourth-scale and 
full-scale water drop tests) were used to redesign the aft heat shield. The aft heat 
shield was strengthened on SC-011, SC-017, and SC-020 by using denser honeycomb 
core in the plus-Z quadrant and chemically milled face sheets varying in thickness from 
0.050 to 0.012 inch. Spacecraft 009 was strengthened by bonding doublers onto the heat 
shield. The BP-28 drop tes ts  and one BP-12A drop test were conducted to verify the 
integrity of the structural  modification made to SC-009. Five additional BP-28 drop tes ts  
and two CM-007 drop tests were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the 
modifications to SC-011, SC-017, and SC-020. 
The test  art icle sank within 2 minutes. Although 
Combined module static test (ATR 131003). - A ser ies  of tes ts  was conducted on 
a stacked CSM (SC-004) to evaluate the integrity of the CSM interface structure for cri t-  
ical maximum qcu and first-stage, end-boost loading, to evaluate the integrity of the 
CM structure in the tension-tie a rea  for critical tension loading at  lift-off, and to ver- 
ify analytical loads and s t r e s s  analyses. The configuration consisted of a portion of the 
LET, a CM, a n  SM, and a short cylindrical section for a base. The SPS tanks were not 
production models; they were aluminum cylinders with aluminum skir ts  and were fitted 
with a thick circular plate inside the cylinder for attachment of the loading fixture. Pro-  
duction tanks were made of titanium and had aluminum ski r t s . .  The skir ts  of the alumi- 
num and titanium tanks were not similar.  
During the end of the first-stage-boost test  condition, noises were heard emanating 
from the spacecraft at  140 percent of limit load. Strain and deflection measurements 
were recorded, and the test  was terminated. Inspection revealed extensive damage to 
the SM aft bulkhead. The bulkhead honeycomb core had crushed adjacent to the outer 
shell in sectors 11, 111, and V (fig. 10). Face-sheet-to-core delamination also had oc- 
curred adjacent to the outer shell in sectors I1 and V and in sector I1 along radial beam 1 
on the aft side of the bulkhead. Bond separation had occurred between the bulkhead for- 
ward face sheet and a ring in sector I1 adjacent to radial beam 2 as well as in sectors  I1 
and VI adjacent to radial beam 6. Bond separation also had occurred between the bulk- 
head core and radial beam 1.  Two possible solutions to this problem were to strengthen 
the bulkhead on the test  art icle and all flight vehicles and retest  to the design require- 
ment of 150 percent of limit load or to accept the demonstrated capability of 140 percent 
of limit load. The latter solution was  chosen because it was the least costly and did not 
require a retest. The Block I1 SM was being designed with a factor of safety of 1 . 4  for  
the portion aft of the upper bulkhead. Therefore, the acceptance of a factor of safety 
of 1.4 was considered logical. No further testing of the first-stage end-boost condition 
was  conducted at that time. 
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After the tes t s  were completed on the stacked CSM-004 (for first-stage end-boost 
condition), it was discovered that, although the SM aft bulkhead had been loaded cor- 
responding to the correct total propellant load, bays I1 and V had been underloaded be- 
cause of an incorrect simulation of the propellant loading on individual tanks. Although 
the Block I SPS oxidizer tanks a r e  of equal size, they a r e  filled for flight by filling the 
sump tank in sector I1 first and then allowing oxidizer to overflow into the storage tank 
in sector V. This results in more oxidizer being stored in the sump tank than in the 
storage tank. Fuel tanks a r e  filled in the same way. Test loads were calculated by 
dividing the total oxidizer and the total fuel loads equally between the sump and storage 
tanks. This e r r o r  caused areas  of the aft bulkhead to be loaded to only 122 percent of 
their end-boost-limit load condition. An additional test  was  conducted to properly ver- 
ify the integrity of the aft bulkhead. The SM static test  art icle used in the original tests 
(SC-004) was no longer available, so the SC-008 SM was used. 
Service module static test  (ATR 321082). - The test  configuration consisted of 
SM-008 with tanks in bays I1 and VI. These tanks were modified to include an approx- 
imately 3-foot-long section of production-type lower tank and skirt .  The other two tanks 
in bays I11 and V were the aluminum cylinders used in the SC-004 test. Because one 
fuel tank and one oxidizer tank had production-type lower sections and skirts,  simulated 
tanks could be used in the other two bays. The CM was represented by a beam arrange- 
ment (called a spider), and a cylindrical base section was used. 
The test  was conducted in February 1968. At 90 percent of limit load, the test 
was interrupted because of high strain readings in the sector I1 (oxidizer sump) tank 
skirt .  Inspection revealed no abnormalities, s o  the test  was continued. At 97 percent 
of limit load, the tank skir t  in sector I1 buckled. The tank skir t  failure was  located aft 
of the skirt-to-tank attachment rivet line; it ran from approximately 9 inches to the left 
of the sector I1 center line to approximately 27 inches to the right of the center line, 
when looking inboard. A test  of the material properties of the failed structure showed 
tensile values above specification requirements. The aft bulkhead of the SM distributes 
the tank skirt  loads into the outer shell of the SM and through radial beams adjacent to 
the tanks. The distribution of s t resses  on the tank skirt  is a function of the stiffness of 
the tank skirt ,  the aft bulkhead, and the attachment of the bulkhead to the radial beams 
and outer shell. The analytically determined stiffnesses used to design these components 
were in e r r o r ;  this e r r o r  resulted in the tank skirt being underdesigned. Static load 
tes ts  previously had been conducted successfully on the SPS tanks and tank skir ts  by 
the manufacturer. However, these tes ts  were conducted with the tank skirt  mounted to 
a rigid base, thus producing incorrect boundary conditions on the skirt  and resulting in 
improper testing of the skirt .  The tank skir t  was modified by adding riveted doublers 
and was retested successfully to 140 percent of limit load. 
These test  failures emphasized the need for the test art icle to be as structurally 
similar to the flight art icle as practical because tes ts  of individual components might 
not provide the proper boundary conditions. The testing of the SC-004 SM using alumi- 
num cylinders to represent the tanks not only produced the incorrect loading into the tank 
skir ts  but also produced the wrong load distribution into the aft bulkhead and radial 
beams of the SM. 
Service module dynamic test (ATR 121006). - Three separate dynamic tes ts  in- 
volving the Block I SM were conducted. The first test, conducted in June 1965, subjected 
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SM-007 to the acoustic environment of the launch and boost phases. 
in 31 separate anomalies or failures, such as cracks in radial beam webs, cracked 
brackets, sheared rivets, broken radial-beam cap-strip tension angles, and a broken 
radial-beam horizontal rib. The angles that connected the radial-beam stiffeners were 
replaced with round tubular s t ruts  that connected the radial-beam edge members. The 
cracked brackets were also strengthened. Results of the SM-007 acoustic test indicated 
that the dynamic response of the vehicle structure was significantly higher than the 
analytically predicted response, and essentially all equipment and components in the 
SM had to be requalified to the higher measured vibration levels. 
This test  resulted 
As a result of the SM-007 test ,  the components were requalified and the primary 
structure modifications were verified through an acoustic test  of a 180" sector of the 
SM. The 180" sector was built to provide versatility for testing components; that is, 
shelves could be fitted with equipment while other components were being tested. 
Dynamic response data from the SC-002 flight in January 1966 were much lower 
than similar data from either the SM-007 or the 180" sector test. Those data revealed 
that the SM-007 and the 180" sector were overtested. Both the SM-007 test and the 
180" sector tes ts  were conducted in a horizontal-flow reverberant test  chamber, with 
a volume that w a s  approximately 4 times that of the SM. The overtest was attributed 
to inadequate calibration and control of the acoustic test  facility. Those inadequacies 
caused the measured vibration response data to be too high, particularly at  frequencies 
less  than 150 hertz. 
In 1965, a dynamic test of the Block I orbital insertion configuration (LES, CSM, 
SLA, IU, and S-IVB booster stage),was conducted at  MSFC. During the test ,  torsional 
oscillating movement of the CM was  observed at the CM/SM interface. This anomaly 
was discussed in the description of the Block I dynamic tests.  
Spacecraft/lunar module adapter (ATR 321033). - Static load testing of the adapter 
subjected the structure to the critical Saturn V ultimate maximum q a  loads. The pur- 
poses of the tes ts  were to prove the structural integrity of SLA-2 and LTA-10 for the 
Saturn V flight configuration, to demonstrate the structural compatibility of SLA-2 and 
LTA-10, and to determine the interaction loads between SLA-2 and LTA-10 during the 
midboost flight phase. When the applied test  load had reached 108 percent of limit load, 
a loud rumbling noise was heard. The test loads were immediately reduced to zero. 
Two strain gages showed high residual strains.  Investigation in the a rea  of these gages 
revealed that (1) the inner face sheet of the SLA aft quarter panel had buckled directly 
aft of the station X 583 f rame between the minus-Z and minus-Y axes; (2) the web of 
the aft section ring at station X 583 was bent locally; (3) the inner face sheet of the aft 
quarter panel had buckled locally; and (4) a void was  created under the buckled inner 
face sheet. This void was approximately 3 inches wide by 72 inches long on each side 
of the 315" splice (45" between the minus-Z and plus-Y axes). 
a 
a 
An investigation of the failure revealed that fittings used to mount the pyrotechnic 
panel thrusters had been omitted from the test article. On flight art icles,  the fittings 
a r e  located just aft of the Xa 583 ring at four locations, 45" with respect to the lateral  
axes. Stress analysis had not shown that these thrusters  were necessary to sustain the 
test  loads; therefore, the thrusters were omitted from the test  article. Another pos- 
sible reason for this failure was  slippage of the splice plate that joins the upper and 
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lower portions of the SLA at station X 583. Test data revealed that, at about 20 per- 
cent of the limit load, the s t r e s s  distribution between the inner and outer face sheets 
above the X 583 ring had changed. This change was  attributed to  slippage of the bolts 
in the splice plate. When the load in the splice plate exceeded the amount of load car- 
ried by friction between the bolthead and splice plate, the bolts slipped until the shank 
of the bolt contacted the splice plate. The holes in the splice plate a r e  drilled larger 
than the bolts to allow clearance for  mating of the two sections either with the SLA 
empty or with the LM installed. In addition to repair of the damaged areas, the follow- 
ing modifications were made to the SLA test article. 
a 
a 
1. The thruster fittings were installed. 
2. A s t rap doubler was  added to the inner flange of the lower ring at sta- 
a 
3. Panel splices were added beneath the four thruster fittings to help distribute 
tion X 583 to prevent the ring from buckling. 
the load from the thrusters into the panels. 
4 .  Additional 0.25-inch bolts were added to the splice plate at  station Xa 583, 
45", 135", 225", and 315", to provide additional load-carrying ability across  the splice. 
5. The torque of all the bolts in the Xa 583 splice plate was increased from 
80 f 10 in-lb to 110 f 10 in-lb to prevent the splice plate from slipping at  low loads. 
Before the thruster fittings were installed but after the structure was repaired, 
a load test  was  conducted to determine the effect of the repairs  on the distribution of 
s t r e s s  from the forward SLA section to the aft section. Then, the thruster fittings were 
installed, and the test  was  repeated. 
the a rea  of the thrusters had been reduced by approximately 45 percent. 
The second test  showed that the s t r e s s  levels in 
After the test  art icle was modified, the SLA static test  was  conducted successfully 
to 150 percent of limit load. Again, this test demonstrated that the test  art icle config- 
uration should be as structurally similar to the flight configuration a s  practical. 
Block I I Ground Test Anomalies 
Although considerable static testing had been done to verify the Block I design, an 
extensive ground test program was required for  the Block I1 spacecraft because of struc- 
tural redesign, increased weight, changed weight distribution, and updated loads. 
During the Block I1 static test  program, several structural failures occurred; 
some of these led to modifications and retesting. In some cases,  a reassessment of the 
loads and environment revealed that the test conditions were too severe and should be 
modified based on the latest environment; in these cases,  no structural  modification o r  
retesting was required. In other cases, structural inadequacies were identified that 
required design modification and retesting. Only those test  failures that required mod- 
ification o r  retesting a r e  discussed in this section. 
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Command module static tes ts  (ATR 222003). - The CM static tests were conducted 
in three parts, as discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Abort load test: The CM test  art icle 2s-2 was subjected to external pressure  
distribution and internal component body loads simulating the critical flight abort loads. 
At approximately 148 percent of limit load, cracks occurred in both the inner and outer 
face sheets near longeron 1 between the plus-Y and plus-Z axes. The upper end of the 
cracks was on the forward bulkhead at  plus-Z, approximately 2 inches outboard of the 
tunnel wall. The crack followed a circular weld path to longeron 1 where it turned 90" 
and extended radially outboard along the longeron to the sidewall and down the sidewall 
adjacent to the longeron. Investigation revealed an excessively thick bond line between 
the cabin wal l  outer face sheets and the longeron that allowed movement between the 
longeron and face sheets. 
modules. A strap doubler extending on either side of the longeron was added to all 
flight command modules to provide increased strength in the failed area.  Test 
art icle 2s-2 was also modified with the s t rap doubler and satisfactorily retested to ul- 
timate load. It was known that bond lines made unintentionally thick resulted in reduced 
properties of the bonded joint. Because most of the command modules had been com- 
pleted through the bonding stage of manufacturing, only the outside doubler was  added 
to the vehicles. 
Excessively thick bond lines were also found on all command 
Main parachute load test: While the CM 2s-2 test  art icle was  being subjected to 
loads representing three-parachute maximum deployment loads at the cri t ical  r i s e r  pull 
angle (tangential direction), a structural failure occurred at approximately 128 percent 
of limit load. 
broke loose from the forward bulkhead, and the outer face sheet between gussets 3 
and 4 tore loose from the thermal isolation ring and core. Because a flight schedule 
impact would have resulted if the static test program had been delayed until repairs  were 
made to the 2s-2 CM, CM-102 was diverted to the static test  program. 
The horizontal beam broke loose from gussets 3 and 4, the vertical beams 
Because of the parachute load test  failure, doublers were added to the inside and 
outside of the tunnel of CM-102 near the parachute r i s e r  attach point. After this change, 
the spacecraft w a s  successfully tested. 
facturing, a somewhat different modification was  used for that vehicle than for  subse- 
quent command modules. Both modifications were verified by static tests.  The cause 
of this anomaly was a design deficiency that resulted from the inability to predict load 
paths and load distribution accurately. After the main parachute tangential load test, a 
main parachute vertical load test  was conducted. This vertical load test  was  terminated 
at approximately 135 percent of limit load when loud noises from within the spacecraft 
indicated structural failure had occurred. Investigation revealed that three tee brackets 
connecting the main display console to the forward bulkhead had become unbonded from 
the lower surface of the forward bulkhead. Inspection of the area beneath the brackets 
revealed voids between the face sheet and core. Analysis showed the failure was caused 
by strain incompatibility between the display console and upper bulkhead. The analysis 
a lso indicated that the t ie between the console and the bulkhead was unnecessary. The 
voids were repaired, the tees were left detached from the test article, and the test  was 
completed satisfactorily. The display panel connections to the brackets were removed 
from subsequent spacecraft. 
Because CM-101 was further along in manu- 
Forward heat shield mortar reaction load test: While testing simulated loads im- 
posed by firing the pilot parachute mortar,  the upper support bracket failed at 58 per-  
cent of limit load. The bracket was made from fiberglass to provide thermal isolation 
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of the mortar  from the heat shield. The bracket w a s  underdesigned because of the 
inability to predict accurately the material properties in curved laminated fiberglass 
components. A titanium bracket was found to be thermally acceptable and was designed 
and tested successfully to 150 percent of limit load. 
Combined CM/SM static test (ATR 222002). - Static structural tes ts  were conducted 
on the mated CM and SM to ultimate load conditions of critical boost phases during the 
Saturn V launch. The major objective of these tests was  to verify the integrity of the 
primary structure;  a secondary objective was  to  determine the load and s t r e s s  distri-  
bution throughout the CSM. The test art icle configuration consisted of a short section 
of the LET used as a fixture to apply loads to the CM, a structurally representative 
CSM, and a short cylindrical section attached to the aft end of the SM as a base support. 
Maximum qa, load condition: The applied loads were oriented to produce a max- 
imum compression s t r e s s  in the outer cap of SM radial beam 2. At 120 percent of limit 
load, the test  was terminated when a strain gage on radial beam 2 failed to stabilize 
after loading was stopped. Inspection of the test art icle revealed that the single sway 
brace had buckled. The sway brace was connected between the apex of radial beam 6 
and the SM upper bulkhead. This brace, together with the torsional capability of the 
radial beams, was designed to provide the torsional load path between the command and 
service modules. The following three possible causes of the sway brace test  load being 
larger  than expected were identified. 
1. Misalinement of the test fixture used to apply axial load introduced additional 
torsion into the sway brace. 
2. The radial beam trusses  at the upper end of the radial beams were all mis- 
alined so that a corkscrew effect occurred when an axial load was applied to the CM. 
The misalinement exceeded the worst possible tolerance condition. 
3. The secondary effects of body loads were not known and therefore were not 
accounted for  in the design of the sway brace. Analytical predictions of this additional 
torsional load were not possible and the additional load had to be determined by test .  
The tes t  fixture was  realined, the sway brace was redesigned to a larger  and 
stronger tube, and the test  was  successfully conducted to ultimate load. Five sway 
braces were added later when the torsional loads at  the interface were determined to be 
greater than previously predicted. 
At 140 percent of limit load during the retesting of the maximum qcr load con- 
dition, s t ra in  gages located on the SM aft bulkhead between the SPS tank and outer shell 
changed nonlinearly and registered residual strain after the test load was  removed. 
Inspection revealed a face-sheet-to-core delamination on the aft bulkhead. The core 
beneath the void a rea  was filled with bonding material on the test  art icle and on subse- 
quent spacecraft. No retesting for the maximum qcr condition was required because 
the more critical end-boost condition test  would be used for the bulkhead certification. 
test  
test  
First-stage end-boost load condition: The first-stage 
was  terminated at 120 percent of limit load after a loud 
article. Strain gage readings had been recorded at 120 
end-boost load condition 
noise emanated from the 
percent of limit load just 
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before the noise and were recorded again before removing the load. The second read- 
ing showed a sharp increase in s t ra in  in sector III of the SM aft bulkhead. 
in strain was attributed to a load redistribution; however, because considerable time 
would have been required to remove loading fixtures and SM panels to perform a detailed 
inspection, the test  was  continued and achieved 140 percent of limit load without any 
additional problems. Inspection revealed that extensive debonding of the face sheet to 
core  and exterior angle to face sheet had occurred on the SM aft bulkhead. Because of 
the history of structural failure in the Block I SM aft bulkhead and the difficulty in pre- 
dicting the failing load of honeycomb structure, modification was  judged necessary. 
bulkhead was modified in the failed a reas  on the test  art icle and on subsequent flight 
service modules by filling the core in bays I1 and V with bonding material and by install- 
ing doublers in each bay designed to prevent separation of the angle from the face sheet. 
The SM with the modification was successfully retested. 
The increase 
The 
The bulkhead failure was primarily due to an inaccurate prediction of load distri-  
bution from the tank skir ts  into the flat bulkhead and then into the adjacent radial beams 
and shell. The load path between the tank skirt  and shell was considerably stiffer than 
predicted and thus received more of the tank load than predicted when the bulkhead was 
designed . 
Flight Anomalies 
The only significant structural  anomaly encountered in the flight test  program 
occurred during the first-stage boost phase of the Apollo 6 mission - the second 
Saturn V flight and the last  Block I mission. Approximately 2 minutes 13 seconds after 
lift-off, abrupt changes of strain,  vibration, and acceleration were indicated by onboard 
instruments in the S-IVB, IU, SLA, LM, and CSM. Airborne photography showed ob- 
jects falling from the a rea  of the SLA (SLA-9); however, the spacecraft continued to 
sustain the required loads, and the mission was not impaired. 
A failure investigation was  begun immediately; however, because the SLA is not 
recovered after a mission, the investigation was limited to analysis of flight data, air- 
borne photography, manufacturing history (inspection records and material  review items), 
ground test data, and review of design and s t r e s s  analysis data. 
The findings of the various reviews and studies were that no basic weakness existed 
in the SLA design and that the SLA loads at  the time of the anomaly were less than those 
demonstrated in the ground test  program. When the anomaly occurred, two independent 
pressure transducers registered pressure drops indicating a hole or holes had opened 
in the spacecraft. The suspected holes, the shift in instrument readings, and the photo- 
graphs of objects falling from the SLA led investigators to the conclusion that portions 
of the SLA honeycomb panels had failed and had fallen from the spacecraft. It was also 
concluded that because the designed structural  capability of the SLA was more than ade- 
quate for  the flight loads experienced, the failure occurred because of an undetected 
manufacturing defect. One possible cause of the failure was separation of face sheets 
f rom the honeycomb core because entrapped moisture in the honeycomb cells became 
heated during boost, thereby increasing the pressure inside the cells until the face  sheets 
were blown off. 
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To eliminate the problems associated with entrapped moisture on each subsequent 
SLA, small  holes were drilled in the inner face sheets of the panels to permit venting 
during ascent. Cork insulation was applied over the entire external surface, whereas 
only the lower portion of the SLA had been insulated with cork on previous flight tests.  
The reduced SLA skin temperatures afforded by the increased insulation would lower 
thermal s t resses ,  reduce pressure inside the honeycomb cells, and prevent reduction 
in material  properties caused by higher temperatures. 
After the manufacture and inspection of SLA-9 but before the SLA-9 flight, radio- 
graphic inspection of splices was begun to supplement the ultrasonic inspection. This 
improved the inspection of splice joints and resulted in the detection of a slipped blind 
splice plate at station Xa 709 on a later SLA. A postflight review of the SLA-9 C-scan 
records (from ultrasonic inspection) indicated that the blind splice plate at  station Xa 709 
also could have been mislocated o r  slipped, thereby weakening a joint. To eliminate 
the possibility of a defective splice joint at station X 709, this joint was redesigned to 
enable more accurate inspection. As shown in figure 21, the honeycomb panel splice 
joint at station Xa 709 on SLA-9 consisted of an inside (blind) and an outside splice 
plate on the outer face sheet, two core splices, and a splice plate on the inner face 
sheet arranged such that the splice plate edges and the core splices were a t  approxi- 
mately the same stations. The inspection procedure used on SLA-9 and each previous 
SLA included ultrasonic inspection of all honeycomb panels with C-scan printouts of the 
ultrasonic inspection being made and retained for permanent record. The alinement of 
splice plate edges and core splices, which used a foam core filling material, made the 
interpretation of the ultrasonic inspection data extremely difficult. To remedy this 
situation, the splice joint at station X 709 was redesigned by removing the blind inside a 
splice plate from the outer face sheet, enlarging the outside splice plate on the outer 
face sheet, and relocating the core splices s o  that the plate edges and splices were not 
a 
alined. This provided a clear a rea  for  ul- 
trasonic and radiographic inspection and 
made interpretation of these inspections 
much easier and more accurate. This re-  
design was implemented on SLA-22 and 
each subsequent SLA; all other SLA panels 
had been manufactured at  that time. The 
redesign was  considered a product im- 
provement and not a mandatory design 
change. 
Although the cause of the Apollo 6 
structural  anomaly could not be determined 
conclusively, the most likely causes have 
been eliminated. The inspection records 
of each SLA after SLA-9 have been thor- 
oughly reanalyzed, and the aforementioned 
modifications have been implemented to 
provide confidence in the flightworthiness 
of each SLA. No SLA structural anomalies 
have occurred since the Apollo 6 flight. 
New design 
Splice Outside face sheet 
I I 
0.125 by0.002 i n .  perforated ~ \-‘,ore 
Splice splice 0.25 byO.OO1 in .  perforated 
Original design 
2- 
Core splice 
1 
Inside face sheet 
0.25 byO.OO1 in. perforated 
Figure 21. - Honeycomb splice joint. 
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The experiences associated with this anomaly indicate that, in the design of honey- 
comb panel structures, avoiding overlapping edges and splices and making the structure 
easy to inspect should be strong design considerations. The possible detrimental effects 
of entrapped moisture in honeycomb core cells should also be considered. 
CONCLUD I NG REMARKS 
Many of the structural failures that occurred in the ground test  program were 
caused by inaccurate predictions of load paths and load distribution. Two examples of 
these a re  the failures of the Block I and Block I1 service module aft bulkheads and the 
failure of the single sway brace. The ability to make accurate mathematical models 
of the structure and to predict load distribution progressively improved during the 
Apollo Program. This ability will  be useful in providing more accurate analyses for 
future programs. However, a rigorous test  program should be conducted to uncover 
any design or manufacturing weaknesses. 
The use of honeycomb sandwich structure has some inherent difficulties that 
should be considered for future programs. 
extremely important, and every effort should be made to avoid a design that may com- 
plicate the inspection. For example, in the design of joints, overlapping core and face 
sheet splices and doublers should be avoided. Good inspection methods a r e  now avail- 
able, and the use of honeycomb should not be excluded on future spacecraft. The use  
of perforated core should be avoided on future spacecraft because of the possibility of 
moisture being absorbed by the honeycomb cells. 
The inspection of honeycomb structure is 
No major schedule perturbations were caused by structural problems. Even the 
one flight structural  failure on Apollo 6 did not prevent the success of that mission. 
Modifications to the structure required by test  failures were made without major rede- 
sign. The axial-torsional coupling discovered during the Marshall Space Flight Center 
dynamic tes ts  showed the torsional loads to be almost an order of magnitude greater 
than those used for design; however, loads were reduced simply by installing additional 
aluminum tube sway braces at  the command module/service module interface. 
The testing of components requires extreme care  to assure  that the proper bound- 
a r y  conditions a r e  imposed on the component. For example, problems that occurred 
with the service module service propulsion system tank skir ts  and aft bulkhead would 
have been avoided had the proper tanks been used in the first  command-and-service- 
module-type static test. Whenever possible, test  hardware should be structurally sim- 
ilar to flight hardware to eliminate this type problem. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, March 1, 1974 
9 14- 50-31-00- 72 
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APPENDIX A 
DEVELOPMENT TESTS SUMMARY 
LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER 
1 ATR 502-3 - Struc tura l  Tubing Test 
Tests were conducted to evaluate the ability to fabricate welded tube joints for 
tower use. 
BOOST PROTECTIVE COVER 
ATR 131005 - Boost Protective Cover Static S t ruc tura l  Test 
Tests were conducted to determine the maximum load-carrying capability and 
mode of failure of the typical lap joint sections of the soft boost protective cover (BPC). 
ATR 391013 - Apollo Boost Protective Cover 
Crew Hatch Window Panel S t ruc tura l  Test 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the load-deflection characteristics of the 
window panel assembly under critical Apollo mission aerodynamic pressure,  (2) to 
provide structural verification of the window panel assembly to withstand critical 
Apollo mission requirements without failing at ultimate loading conditions, and (3) to 
determine the ultimate strength of the window panel assembly and failure mode caused 
by mission aerodynamic pressure.  
ATR 391020 - Nomex-Layered Aft Boost Cover 
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate the structural integrity of the BPC on 
the command module (CM) for the normal and backup tower-jettison mission under 
conditions of 250" F temperature and simulated inertial loading, and (2) to determine 
the load-deflection characteristics of the aft boost cover under the two tower- j ettisoning 
conditions. 
'Apollo Test Requirement. 
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COMMAND MODULE 
ATR 112-B -Ma in  Parachute Riser Attachment Test 
Tests were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the parachute r i se r  
attachment assembly for  the boilerplate CM when loaded by riser harness at critical 
angles. 
ATR 112-1 - M a i n  Parachute Riser Attachment Test 
Tests  were conducted to determine failure loads of the parachute r i se r  attachment 
assembly for the boilerplate CM when loaded by the tension strap at critical angles. 
ATR 208-2.2 - Command Module Reentry 
Heat Shield Component Test 
Tests  were conducted to determine the structural and thermal characteristics of 
ablator and honeycomb. 
ATR 211-5 -Ma in  Longeron to Parachute 
Typical Attachment Test 
Tests were conducted to determine the ultimate strength of a typical longeron-to- 
parachute attaching lug. 
ATR 212-1 - Property Tests of Candidate Apollo 
Observation Window Mater ia ls 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the effects of vacuum, cryogenic tem- 
peratures, and charged-particle radiation on various glass materials, together with the 
thermal and mechanical properties of the materials, and (2) to investigate optimum 
methods for  sealing and protecting window panels. 
ATR 212-4 - Thermal Test of Sample Command Module 
Heat Shield Window Glass 
A test was conducted to determine the thermal gradient through the glass under a 
simulated, front-face, temperature-time history. 
ATR 331030 - Meteoroid Shielding Tests 
Tests were conducted (1) to develop and verify empirical formulas for the response 
of the command and service module (CSM) to meteoroid impact, and (2) to verify the 
integrity of these structures. 
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ATR 214-2A - Aft Heat Shield Flexibil i ty 
These tests were conducted (1) to verify analytical methods for predicting the 
s t resses  and deflections of a hemispherical sheet under localized unsymmetrical loads, 
and (2) to support the sphere and the sphere-toroid programs used for the aft heat shield. 
ATR 471001 - General Instab i l i ty  of Sandwich Cyl inders 
Subjected to Pure  Axial Compression and Pure  Bending 
These tests were conducted to verify the analytical methods for predicting general 
instability failure of sandwich cylinders subjected to axial compression or bending. 
ATR 471002 - General I nstabi l i ty of Sandwich Cones 
Subjected to P u r e  Axial Compression 
These tests were conducted to verify analytical methods for predicting general 
instability failure of sandwich cones subjected to axial-compression load. These tes ts  
supported the methods prepared fo r  use on the CM and spacecraft/lunar module (LM) 
adapter (SLA). 
ATR 214-3A - Evaluation of Mechanical 
Properties of Some Rigid Foams 
The test was conducted (1) to determine the mechanical properties of rigid foam 
and (2) to determine the feasibility of using a rigid foam as core material in later sand- 
wich cylinder tests. This test supported ATR 471001. 
ATR 217 - Command Module Bulkhead Component 
Test - Tee and Beam Configuration 
The test was conducted to determine the strength characteristics of tees with 
different flange thicknesses when bonded to aluminum alloy honeycomb beams. 
ATR 218- Apollo Steel Honeycomb Joint  Test 
This was a proof test of Apollo joint designs; i t  also verified analytical methods. 
These data verified the load-carrying ability of typical Apollo joints. Design variations 
were tested to verify analytical methods for  joint design. 
ATR 220 - Steel Honeycomb Foundation Modulus Test 
This test  was conducted to establish the honeycomb core foundation modulus that 
This test, in support of ATR 218, was describes the load response of the face sheets, 
conducted (1) to permit design of ATR 218 test specimens and (2) to verify test  methods. 
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ATR 223 - Command Module Penetration Seal Leak Tests 
These tests were conducted (1) to determine the helium leakage rates of butyl 
rubber O-rings and molded-in-place butyl rubber gaskets proposed for sealing inner 
structure penetrations, and (2) to determine the sealing properties of reused O-rings 
and the compression set of the gaskets. 
I ATR 331034 - Aft  Heat Shield Water I mpact Test 
I This test  was conducted to determine the dynamic effect on a composite structure 
from water impact. 
ATR 331035 - I mpact Load Test - Command Module 
Af t  Heat Shield Quarter Panel 
I The impact load test was conducted (1) to determine the structural response of 
a modified aft heat shield quarter panel to impact loading, (2) to determine the s t ress ,  
load o r  pressure,  and acceleration characteristics of the test  panel under impact con- 
ditions, and (3) to develop a method to determine load and impact pressures  for other 
test  ser ies .  
ATR 331036 - Aft Heat Shield Component 
Test - Pyrotechnic Pressure 
The test  was conducted (1) to evaluate the structural integrity of the proposed aft 
heat shield configuration for water impact, and (2) to verify the analytical s t r e s s  analy- 
sis for impact loading. 
ATR 331037 - Apollo Brazed Steel Honeycomb Repair Test 
The tes t  was conducted (1) to verify existing repair  design criteria and (2) to 
establish design data for new repair methods. 
ATR 252 - Particle I mpact Test of Two-Sheet St ructures 
This test was conducted (1) to investigate the resistance of two-sheet structures 
to penetration by hypervelocity projectiles to extend and verify analytical methods, and 
(2) to investigate parameters and structural configurations of interest to Apollo that 
were not included in  ATR 331030. 
ATR 291 - Hatch Window Breakage Feasibil i ty 
This test  was conducted to determine the feasibility of, and the effort required 
for,  breaking and removing the hatch window glass to provide ventilation for the crew 
after landing. 
3s 
ATR 321013 - Fasteners and Joi nt Tests 
These tests were conducted to obtain design allowables for various types of 
joints in  honeycomb structure. 
SERVICE MODULE 
ATR 304 - Aft  Bulkhead Attachments 
Tests were conducted on attachments of the radial beam shear webs to the aft 
bulkhead and the service propulsion system (SPS) tank support structure. A failure 
during this test required rework and a repeat of the test  as ATR 304-2. 
ATR 301-5 - Radial Shear Web 
Tests were conducted to verify the design approach for an extremely light, 
partial-tension field beam. This beam w a s  manufactured by machining integral stiff- 
eners,  webs, and caps from a thick aluminum plate. 
ATR 301-3 - Aft Bulkhead 
Tests were conducted to verify the design approach on a section of the aft bulk- 
head under simulated spacecraft loading. 
ATR 301-1 - Outer Panel 
This test was conducted on a typical outer panel under akial and simulated air 
loads. to verify the design approach. 
ATR 301-12 - Outer Panel Joint  
Tests were conducted to verify the adequacy of blind attachments to honeycomb 
panels. 
ATR 304-2 - Aft  Bulkhead Components 
Additional testing of local attachments on the aft bulkhead was performed because 
of a failure on ATR 304. 
ATR 301-7 - Fric t ion Jo int  
Tests were conducted to determine the local characterist ics associated with 
attaching the outer panels to the radial shear webs and bulkheads with oversized holes. 
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ATR 301-9 - Panel Edge Member 
This test was conducted to determine the basic load path from honeycomb panel 
through an extruded edge member to the support structure. 
ATR 321013 - Fasteners and Joints 
These tests were conducted to determine design allowables on methods of 
fastening clips, brackets, and supports to honeycomb structure. 
ATR 304-1 - Service Module Aft Bulkhead 
Splice and Shear Panel Test 
Tests  were conducted to evaluate the bonded splice and shear panel tie of the 
service module (SM) aft bulkh.ead. 
ATR 309-1 - Joint Tests; SM to SLA 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the structural integrity of the barrel  nut/ 
epoxy-filled joint design, and (2) to determine the limit and ultimate load-carrying 
capability of the joint. 
ATR 309-2 - Fasteners and Joint Tests 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine design allowables for spacecraft (SC) 
joints such as angles, tees, channels, et  cetera, and (2) to determine ultimate load- 
carrying capabilities for spacecraft joints. 
ATR 321007 - Adjustable Radial Beam Pads 
This test was conducted to verify a late design change, made after initial testing 
of ATR 301-5. This test was  performed on the subcomponent level because the change 
went into effect after SC-004 was built. 
SPACECRAFTlLM ADAPTER 
ATR 402-1 - Panel Thermal Tests 
These tests were conducted on 21 small honeycomb panels representative of the 
SLA shell structure. The panels were tested to failure at  elevated temperatures to 
substantiate design allowables. 
ATR 402-2 - Joint Tests 
Tests on these joints were conducted to verify the design approach on 12-inch- 
wide sections of each SLA joint at  elevated temperatures. 
ATR 403-2 - Lunar Excursion Module Support Structure 
Tests were conducted on two specimens, representative of the LM (formerly 
LEM) attachment a rea  of the SLA, (1) to verify the design approach and (2) to supple- 
ment the s t r e s s  analysis. 
ATR 322012 -The SMlSLA Joint 
Tests were conducted on a small section of the SM/SLA joint to limit and ulti- 
mate tensile loads. 
i 
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APPENDIX B 
COMPONENT TESTS SUMMARY 
LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER 
ATR 500-1 - Launch Escape Tower 1 
Separation Fitt ing Test 
Tests  were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the launch escape tower 
(LET) attachment housing for  design loads. 
ATR 502-2 - Launch Escape Tower Attachment Fit t i  ng  Test 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the strength and failure mode of the attach- 
ment between the LET and tower skirt ,  and (2) to verify s t r e s s  analysis methods. 
BOOST PROTECTIVE COVER 
ATR 505-1 - Boost Protective Cover 
Panel Fastener Test 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the shear characteristics of the boost 
protective cover (BPC) panel fastener, (2) to determine if the BPC fastener joint could 
sustain the following ultimate design loads without failure: configuration A - 75 lb/in. 
(150 pounds per  fastener), and configuration B - 125 lb/in., and (3) to determine the 
failure load and mode of failure of each specimen. 
ATR 391008 - Boost Protective Cover Longitudinal Splice 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the shear strength and deflection charac- 
terist ics of the longitudinal splice joint, and (2) to determine the failure load and mode 
of failure of the longitudinal splice joint. 
'Apollo Test Requirement. 
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COMMAND MODULE 
ATR 331022 - Static Test of Base Section Subassembly, 
Inner S t ruc tu re  and Aft  Heat Shield Subst ruc ture  
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate the strength of the command module 
(CM) heat shield for the 20g reentry condition, (2) to determine load-deflection data, 
and (3) to verify analysis methods. After these tests,  the aft heat shield was used in 
conjunction with boilerplate elements for a water impact test. 
ATR 331023 - Static Test of Typical I n n e r  S t ruc tu re  
to Heat Shield Attachment, Station Xc 42.67 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine the joint shear strength and deflection 
characteristics and (2) to determine the failure load and mode of failure of the typical 
inner structure to heat shield sl ip joint at station Xc 42.67. 
ATR 331024 - Static Test of Support Brackets of t he  
CM Helium, Potable Water, and Fuel Tanks 
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate by a static test the the support-bracket 
assembly and installations could sustain limit-design loads without yielding and could 
sustain ultimate-design loads, and (2) to verify the analysis methods. 
ATR 331025 - Test of Modular Element of t he  
CM Lower Equipment Bay 
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate by a static test that the individual elec- 
tronic compartments would sustain limit-design loads without yielding and would sustain 
ultimate-design loads without failure of the mounting-clamp assemblies, and (2) to ob- 
tain load-deflection data. 
ATR 331026 - Static Test of Typical Section of 
t he  CM Lower Equipment Bay 
Tests were conducted (1) to determine whether the action of the attachment clamp 
is affected by  boost loads, (2) to determine whether the lower equipment bay (LEB) sec- 
tion would sustain limit-design loads without yielding of the mounting assemblies, 
(3) to determine whether the LEB section would sustain ultimate-design loads without 
failure of the mounting assemblies, and (4) to obtain load-deflection data. 
ATR 331027 - Typical Attachment Test, Launch Escape 
System Tower and Forward Heat Shield to I n n e r  S t ruc tu re  
Tests were conducted (1) to determine LET bolt torque requirements for obtaining 
a specified bolt preload, (2) to determine the effects of axial preloading in the bolt 
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during application of critical mission condition loading, (3) to demonstrate that the joint 
could sustain limit-design loads without yielding and ultimate-design loads without fail-  
ure ,  and (4) to determine load versus deflection characteristics and s t ra in  characteris- 
t ics of the joint. 
ATR 331029 - Test of C M  I n n e r  Cabin Window Panels and Seals 
Tests  were conducted (1) to determine the validity of the window seal configura- 
tion, (2) to ascertain that the leak rate was within acceptable limits, (3) to determine 
the ability of the inner cabin window assembly to sustain limit-design loads without 
yielding and ultimate-design loads without failing, (4) to determine deflections at se- 
lected locations, and (5) to find maximum load capabilities and mode failures. 
ATR 331041 -Test of CM and Heat Shield Window Panel and Seals 
Tests  were conducted (1) to verify the ability of the window glass,  retainer, and 
panel to sustain the ultimate-design aerodynamic pressure without failing, (2) to define 
the airload versus deflection and strain characteristics of the heat shield window panels, 
(3) to verify the ability of the heat shield .window assemblies to sustain the most cri t ical  
entry heating environment without failing, and (4) to evaluate thermally induced s t resses  
and deflection characteristics of window glass and retainers. 
ATR 219 - Struc tura l  Test of Crew Compartment 
Heat Shield Str inger 
Tests  were conducted (1) to determine the spring ra te  of the heat shield stringer 
under transverse loading when fully compressed, half extended, and fully extended, 
(2) to determine the allowable tensile load of the assembly, and (3) to determine the 
mode of failure under transverse loading. 
ATR 331042 - Test of CM Crew Hatch Tongue and 
Groove Edge Members, Heat Shield 
Tests  were conducted (1) to evaluate the structural integrity of joint edge mem- 
be r s  under loads, (2) to determine design-limit and ultimate-load values under the 
Apollo mission environment, and (3) to determine the mode of failure in  tension and 
compression. 
ATR 331033 - Command ModulelService Module 
Compression Shear Tie 
Tests  were conducted (1) to demonstrate that the command module/service mod- 
ule' (CM/SM) interface shear compression and tension tie could sustain ultimate-design 
loads without failing, (2) to verify analytical-loads analysis of the compression-shear 
pad, and (3) to determine the mode of failure of the CM/SM interface. 
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ATR 331054 - Forward Cyl i  nderlLongeron Gusset 
Assembly, Static S t ruc tura l  Tests 
Tests were conducted to demonstrate that the forward cylinder gusset assemblies 
would sustain limit-design loads without yielding and ultimate-design loads without fai l -  
ing when subjected to drogue o r  main parachute wraparound loads. 
ATR 391022 - Frangible Nut, LETlCM I nterface Jo int  
Tests were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the frangible nut and 
LET/CM interface joint for spacecraft (SC) 011 and subsequent spacecraft. 
ATR 321011 - Reaction Control System Engine and Tank Supports 
Tests were conducted on the tank support structure to simulated dynamic loading 
using equivalent static loads. 
ATR 131004 - The CMlSM Fai ri ng  
Tests were conducted to verify the adequacy of the CM/SM fairing for the ultimate 
boost differential pressure and umbilical disconnect loads. 
SPACECRAFTILUNAR MODULE ADAPTER 
No component tes ts  were conducted on the spacecraft/lunar module adapter. 
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APPENDIX C 
COMPLETE MODULE TESTS SUMMARY (BLOCK I) 
LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER 
1 ATR 500 - Structura l  Test of Launch Escape Tower 
Tests  were conducted (1) to verify the structural integrity of the launch escape 
tower (LET) for  critical flight loading conditions, (2) to determine the ultimate strength 
and failure characterist ics of the tower, and (3) to determine the deflection character- 
istics of the tower. 
I 
COMMAND MODULE 
ATR 131003 and ATR 131006 - Combined Module Static 
Tests - Command Module and Service Module 
Tests  were conducted (1) to evaluate the integrity of the command module (CM) 
interface structure for critical mdximum qa and end-boost first-stage loading, (2) to 
evaluate the integrity of the CM structure in  the tension-tie a r ea  for critical tension 
loading at lift-off, and (3) to verify the analytical loads and s t r e s s  analysis. 
ATR 251001 and ATR 251002 - Command Module 
Static Structural  Tests 
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate by a ser ies  of static tes ts  simulating 
various flight environments that the CM or  component assembly of the CM would sus- 
tain ultimate test loads without failure, (2) to obtain load-deflection data, and (3) to 
verify analysis methods. Test  conditions included three main parachute load conditions, 
pilot parachute mortar loads, drogue parachute deployment load, crew couch attach 
loads, abort loads, and 165 percent of abort loads. 
ATR 251003 - Command Module Static Structural-Thermal Test 
Tests were conducted (1) to perform a design evaluation of the CM heat shield 
system under Block I heat load trajectory 3A overshoot entry, trajectory-simulated 
environment, (2) to verify the ability of the heat shield strain isolation support system 
to function properly during entry without jeopardizing the integrity of the ablative 
thermal-protective system, (3) to evaluate the structural-thermal characteristics 
(deflection, s t r e s s ,  gaps, misalinements, and temperature) of heat shield components 
'Apollo Test Requirement. 
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under entry conditions, and (4) to evaluate the performance of the thermal-protective 
(insulation) system to limit the inner-structure outer-surface temperature to 200" F 
ATR 111014 - Command Module Static Tests, Forward Section 
A series of tes ts  w a s  conducted to demonstrate that the CM Earth-landing system 
support structure would sustain limit-design loads without yielding. 
SERVI CE MODULE 
ATR 131007 - Engine M o u n t  Stiffness Test 
Tests were conducted to determine the stiffness of the Block I service propulsion 
subsystem (SPS) engine mounting. Ultimate engine thrust loads were also applied. 
ATR 131003 - Service Module Static S t ruc tura l  Test 
Tests were conducted that subjected the service module (SM) structure to the 
critical Saturn V limit and ultimate boost loads. Thermal environments were not 
applied. 
ATR 321082 - Service Module Af t  Bulkhead Test 
Tests were conducted to demonstrate the structural  capabilities of the modified 
Block I SM aft bulkhead and SPS propellant tanks with skir ts  representative of space- 
craft (SC) 020 to the loading environment of the Saturn V end-of-first-stage boost 
condition. 
S PACECRAFTlLUNAR MODULE ADAPTER 
Tests (ATR 321031 and ATR 321033) were conducted that subjected the spacecraft/ 
lunar module (LM) adapter (SLA) structure to the critical Saturn I-B and Saturn V limit 
and ultimate maximum qa! loads. The test for the Saturn I-B loads used a flight 
stiffener, and the test for the Saturn V loads used LM test article 10 (LTA-10). Tests  
with LTA-10 also were conducted to demonstrate the structural compatibility of SLA-2 
and LTA-10 and to determine the interaction loads between LTA-10 and SLA-2. 
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DYNA 
APPENDIX D 
AI C TESTS SUM AARY 
COMMAND MODULE DEVELOPMENT TEST 
ATR 205 - Vibration and Acoustic Tests of Typical 1 
Command Module Panels 
These tests were conducted (1) to determine acoustic transmissibility and sonic- 
induced vibration of complex structural panels when subjected to narrow- and broad- 
band random vibration as well  as reverberant and progressive wave acoustic excitation, 
(2) to evaluate the response of complex panels to narrow- and broad-band random vibra- 
tion excitation, (3) to determine natural vibration response modes and structural damp- 
ing coefficients of complex panels, (4) to determine natural response modes and 
damping coefficients of ablative-covered heat shield panels and to evaluate the fatigue 
strength of ablative material bonding methods at the predominant panel response fre- 
quency, and (5) to evaluate the effect of elevated temperatures (entry heat loads) on 
vibration response characteristics of ablative-covered heat shield panels. 
COMMAND MODULE COMPONENT TEST 
ATR 321025 - Dynamic Tests of Support Brackets of the  
Command Module Helium, Potable Water, and Fuel Tanks 
These tests were conducted (1) to determine the structural  response under sinus- 
oidal excitation (mechanical vibration), and (2) to determine the structural integrity 
under random vibration. 
ATR 331053 - Dynamic Test of Typical Section of the 
Command Module Lower Equipment Bay 
This test  was conducted (1) to evaluate the lower equipment bay (LEB) structural 
response in the dynamic environment, (2) to appraise the vibration input to the individ- 
ual electronic components when mounted in the LEB, (3) to evaluate coldplate response 
when mounted in the LEB and subjected to a dynamic environment, and (4) to appraise 
the response of the electronic unit attachment clamps when mounted in the LEB and 
subjected to a dynamic environment. 
'Apollo Test Requirement. 
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SERVICE MODULE COMPONENT TEST 
ATR 321011 - Reaction Control System Engine and 
Tank Support Test 
This test w a s  conducted to simulated dynamic loading using equivalent static loads. 
ATR 311002 - Reaction Control Subsystem Module Acoustic Test 
This test subjected a reaction control system (RCS) quadrant on a large panel and 
a complete RCS module and service module (SM) panel to an acoustic environment. 
COMMAND MODULE TEST 
ATR 121006 - Spacecraft Acoustic Environmental Test 
This test was  conducted on spacecraft (SC) 007 to verify the structural integrity 
of the spacecraft when subjected to a laboratory simulation of the maximum acoustic 
environment anticipated during launch. Acoustic attenuation and vibration response 
characteristics of the structure were determined. 
SERVICE MODULE TEST 
ATR 121006 - Service Module Acoustic Tests 
These tests were conducted on SC-007 to verify the adequacy of the spacecraft 
when subjected to acoustic environments with simulated subsystems installed. 
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APPENDIX E 
STAT1 C STRUCTURAL TESTS SUMMARY (BLOCK I I )  
LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM COMPONENT TEST 
ATR 392002 - Apol lo Launch Escape Tower Static 
St ructura l  Test - Block I I 
1 
Tests  were conducted to demonstrate the ability of the Block II launch escape 
tower (LET) and LET/command module (CM) joint structure to sustain Saturn V abort 
condition ultimate loads without failure. 
ATR 332117 - Boost Protective Cover Tower Leg Fai r ing 
Tests were conducted (1) to evaluate the structural integrity and to establish the 
mode of failure of the boost protective cover (BPC) tower leg fairing, and (2) to demon- 
strate the failure modes resulting from the Saturn V maximum qa, abort pressure loading. 
COMMAND MODULE COMPONENT TESTS 
ATR 332172 - M a i n  Display Console Static St ructura l  Test 
Tests  were conducted to demonstrate that the main display console panels and 
supporting structure could sustain a vertical inertia load of 78g. 
ATR 332113 - Command Module Thermal I solator R ing  Static Test 
Tests  were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the CM forward tunnel 
isolation ring. 
ATR 332204 - Static Test of Nylon Sea Hoist ing S l i ng  Assembly, 
CM-108 and Subsequent Vehicles 
Tests were conducted (1) to verify the ability of the nylon sea  hoisting sling assem- 
bly, its attaching hardware, and CM backup structure to sustain ultimate design load 
without failing, (2) to determine the ultimate capability and failure mode of the nylon 
sling, and (3) to determine the amount of degradation caused by salt  water soaking of 
the nylon sling. 
'Apollo Test Requirement. 
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COMMAND MODULE TESTS 
ATR 222003 - Spacecraft 2s-2 C M  Static Structural Test 
Tests were conducted (1) to verify the adequacy of the CM structure to withstand 
design-ultimate loads simulating the crit ical  flight-loading environment without failing 
and design-limit load without yielding, and (2) to determine stress levels, load distri- 
butions, and deformations of the structure under loads. 
ATR 222015 - Block I I C M  (2s-2) Static Test in Support of 
Command and Service Module 103 and Subsequent.Spacecraft 
Tests were conducted (1) to verify that the CM structure could withstand design- 
limit and ultimate loads, and (2) to determine s t r e s s  levels, load distributions, and 
deformations of the structure under load. Test conditions were at room temperature and 
included three main parachute deployment load tests, drogue parachute wraparound load 
(abort case) (both repeats of ATR 222003), docking ring separation reaction load on the 
CM tunnel, CM cabin burst pressure test (repeat of ATR 222003 on new combined 
hatch), and docking ring interface point contact load. 
ATR 222020- Block I I C M  Parachute Load Static Test in Support 
of Command and Service Module 109 and Subsequent Spacecraft 
Tests were conducted (1) to verify that the CM structure could withstand design- 
limit loads without yielding and ultimate loads without failing, and (2) to determine stress 
levels, load distributions, and deformations of the structure under loads. 
ATR 332141 - Apollo C M  I n n e r  Structure Crew Couch St ru t  
Attachments Static Structural Tests 
Tests were conducted (1) to demonstrate the structural integrity of the crew couch 
attachments to sustain design-ultimate loads without failing, and (2) to determine the 
maximum load-carrying capability and failure mode. 
SERVICE MODULE 
ATR 222005 - Apollo C M  to Service Module Fairing Static Test 
Tests were conducted to demonstrate that the Block II CM/service module (SM) 
fairing could sustain Saturn V boost-phase limit and ultimate differential pressures .  
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ATR 332071 - Static Test of Reaction Control System Tank 
(Fuel and Helium) Brackets and Mounting o n  S M  Panel 
Tests  were conducted (1) to verify the  structural integrity of the reaction control 
system (RCS) fuel and helium tank brackets for the critical mission loads, (2) to verify 
the structural integrity of the mounting of the RCS tank brackets to the SM panel, and 
(3) to determine the structural characteristics (Le. ,  load deflection and stress) of the 
RCS panel and tank brackets. 
ATR 332072 , 312003-2 - Static Test of S M  RCS Panel and 
RCS Oxidizer Bracket Mounting Assembly 
Tests were conducted (1) to verify the structural integrity of the redesigned RCS 
panel splice at station X 287 under combined shell and tank loads, (2) to verify the 
structural integrity of the SM and CM oxidizer tank brackets and the attachment of these 
brackets to the RCS panel wider mission load environment, (3) to determine the struc- 
tural characteristics of the redesigned panel (i. e. ,  deflection and stress produced by 
mission loads, maximum qcu , and dynamic forces), and (4) to determine the .maximum 
load-carrying capability of the panel/brackets . 
S 
COMMAND AND SERV ICE MODULE STACK TESTS 
ATR 222002 - Apollo Combined Module Static Tests (2s-2) 
Tests were conducted (1) to evaluate the structural integrity of the combined modu- 
lar structure for boost-phase aerodynamic and inertial loads, and (2) to determine load 
and s t r e s s  distribution within the vehicle. 
ATR 222013 - Apollo Block I I CMlSM Stack Static Test 
Tests were conducted to verify the structural integrity of the CM/SM interface 
with the SM radial beam configuration modified to the six sway braces. The 1ate.st 
Saturn V maximum qcu loads were imposed for the most critical condition to demon- 
strate that the CM/SM structure could withstand limit and ultimate loads. 
ATR 222014 and ATR 222018- Block I I CMlSM Stack Static 
Test - Saturn V First-Stage End Boost 
Tests  were conducted to demonstrate that the CM/SM structure could withstand 
limit and ultimate Saturn V first-stage end-boost loads. 
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ATR 222017 - Apollo Block I I CMlSM Stack Static 
Test - Saturn V One-Engine-Out Condition 
Tests were conducted to determine the ability of the launch escape system 
(LES)/CM and CM/SM interface and supporting structure to withstand the critical load 
orientations of the Saturn V one-engine-out condition. 
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